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3BUILDING THE BRIDGE TO THE HIGH ROAD
Executive Summary
Building the Bridge to the High Road takes a hard, critical look at economic, political and social
reality.  While rejecting traditional redistributionist, socialist, social democratic and neo-liberal
capitalist prescriptions, Dan Swinney instead proposes a "High Road" strategy that at times sounds
radically left, at other times radically right.  The truth is that the high road strategy is a synthesis,
adopting some of the best practices of all the rejected ideology-based strategies.  Forged by research
and study, tempered by wide and deep experience, the High Road offers a plausible solution to the
malaise of late industrial society.  Swinney's work has centered on the United States but has global
applicability.
The paper is easily accessible and rich with examples.  The argument is complex but a brief summary
is attempted here.
The gap between the haves and have nots in the U.S. is increasing despite favorable short-term
aggregate economic indicators.  This is a result of disinvestment and deindustrialization, which are in
turn a result of capitalists increasingly turning to speculation and short term profits and away from
production.  More and more capitalists have lost their sense of symbiosis with their communities.
Some have abandoned their duty of stewardship and with it the social contract that functioned in the
first part of this century.  This deviation has been enabled, but not caused, by technological progress
that allows the very rapid flow of capital around the world.
The "market" takes the blame for much of this, but Swinney points out instead that the market is a
neutral mechanism for transactions, not a teleological entity that dictates to its participants.  Poor
business plans, ineffective execution, lack of succession planning and similar fixable firm level
business issues are frequently the causes of job loss.  The short-term values that some owners and
managers bring into the marketplace have caused other job losses.  Only in a minority of cases has
obsolescence or "market necessity" been behind job losses.
The High Road Vision is of a society that is environmentally and economically sustainable, creating
jobs and livelihoods that allow true human development, not mere subsistence.  The High Road
Vision regards productivity, efficiency and profitability as essential but asks:  What values and
priorities are driving decisions within the limits of the market?  How do we use the surplus value
generated by the market?  How creatively and effectively do we use non-market capacities to
accommodate the market's limits?
To carry this vision beyond utopian dreaming or naive comunitarianism, those who would follow the
High Road must implement a dynamic strategy over the next several decades.  This strategy
incorporates popular control of the micro- and macro- economy.  Labor and community groups must
turn from their traditional oppositional redistributionism to a new role as creators and generators of
wealth.  Labor (organized and unorganized) occupies a crucial strategic position and must adopt
capital strategies, that is an "integrated approach to trying to affect all aspects of the structure,
finance, and operations of both single employers and entire industries."  Labor and community need
to recognize the benefits of alliances with each other.  They must use a much broader array of tools
to achieve this vision, including some of the traditional tools of capitalism.  Market forces are among
these tools, but when markets fail, other tools exist to provide correction, including social action.
Government is just one of several essential tools, not the source of all solutions.
Business has a crucial role to play in this strategy.  Sections of the business community are embraced
as strategic and tactical allies.  Swinney makes an important distinction between those who seek a
4fair return through increasing productive capacity and those who seek a return only through
speculation.  Businesses on the High Road are to be allies, businesses who take the Low Road are to
be blocked.
As a vision for society this may sound radical but in fact elements of this vision have been
implemented in individual firms and in some regions of Europe.  Many companies have become high
performance workplaces through greater worker knowledge and control.  Although ESOPS are
usually little more than financing tools, Swinney cites examples of genuine employee owned and
controlled firms.
While the old social contract existed, organizing, including militant organizing, around redistribution
issues was successful.  As long as unions and communities fought for, and received, a bigger piece of
the pie the people organized did not need deep understanding.  Those days are gone.  Swinney
advocates what he describes as the Development Model of Organizing.  This requires that workers
and community members have a clear  understanding of society, think strategically and embrace a
vision.  Oppositional skills are not sufficient.  Today's effective organization must advance a
plausible alternative and achievable business strategy as the context of its demands to maintain or
improve wages and benefits.
The preconditions for success then are well-trained leaders and organizers who can educate their
unions and communities about finance, management, economics and sociology.  Organizing for
wealth creation is a long term proposition so unions and community organizations must themselves
be well managed, high capacity units.
This analysis rejects the customary labeling that treats all businesses, unions or community activists
as automatically bad or good, depending on where one stands.  The paper is critical - in some detail -
of low road businesses, many traditional community development activities that displace residents
and promote low road jobs, and unions that resist stepping up to members' contemporary needs.  At
the same time the essential role of high road businesses, especially those with a high degree of
entrepreneurship, is explained in equal detail.  The critical roles of progressive labor and community
development efforts are also examined.
The High Road is a global strategy advocating international agreements on trade and investment that
incorporate high road values of mutual development while rejecting protectionism and nativism.
David Pfleger
Thornton-Pfleger, Inc.
August 1998
To order copies of Building the Bridge to the High Road send a $10 check or money order to: CLCR,
3411 W. Diversey, Suite 10, Chicago, IL 60647.
5Preface
Nearly forty years ago President Kennedy said:   “Ask not what your country can do for you,  ask
what you can do for your country?”  Since then the traditional social contract in the US and in most
of the developed world,  has been under attack.  The sixties, which have been characterized as  “the
decade of illusion and idealism” passed into the seventies, “the decade of disillusion,”  followed by
the notorious eighties,   “the decade of materialism and realism,” until we finally reached the
nineties, “the decade of alienation, severe decline in trust and loyalty, coupled with a deep suspicion
of business, government and politicians.”  During this time, we have witnessed the almost
exponential growth of electronic technology, and a concomitant growth in the use, and value, of
information, which has exacerbated certain negative trends in societies.
Globalization has become synonymous with re-engineering, or downsizing, while society and most
product and service markets have become bi-polar. In product markets, there are really no middle
range products, only top tier “image” brands and utilitarian private label/generic products;  while in
society, the middle class is disappearing,  the rich get richer and the permanent underclass grows
larger.  Many people are becoming permanently disenfranchised.  These trends cannot continue, a
president of Mexico once said “the way to prevent revolution is to give the people something to
lose.”  In today’s world, unfortunately, the number of those with nothing to lose is growing, leading
to increasing social instability.
Building the Bridge to the High Road, a discussion paper highlighting various ways in which to
expand participation and democracy in the economy in order to build sustainable communities, offers
many provocative and radical thoughts with respect to the roles to be undertaken by business, group
and political leaders over the next several decades.
The High Road proposes the development of a system that will result in the highest and best use of
our human and material resources, in order to create,  rather than merely redistribute,  wealth in a
sustainable manner.
A new social contract must be designed and implemented that stops the disenfranchisement of the
many, and the de-industrialization of western economies.  “Market Forces” must be balanced to
prevent pure speculation, but harnessed to ensure efficient, productive and profitable use of all
available material, financial, technological and human resources in the creation of an economically
and environmentally sustainable social structure.
Dan Swinney, the author of Building the Bridge to the High Road, while placing value on existing
cultural, race and gender issues, emphasizes intellectual honesty, analytical rigor, and a values-driven
vision.  The development of a new, sustainable social structure, demands this disciplined approach,
in addition to the fully informed and inter-active participation of ALL of the constituents.  In
Swinney’s new world, the society will not be bi-polar, but will be inclusive, inter-active, dynamic,
and, at all times, values-driven.
Swinney uses many real-life examples to illustrate his points, clearly differentiating between low-
road strategies that have resulted in short-term speculative gains, and high-road strategies that have
led to sustainable, self-generating situations. Swinney deals with the fact that we must overcome
historical polarization and mistrust. Leaders in all segments of society, including community,
business, unions, religion, politics, education and technology, must all adopt an analytical approach,
embrace intellectual honesty and develop a values-driven vision.  He identifies the traditional
“weaknesses,” and, thus impediments to change, in the historical roles of each of these constituents.
He discusses the roles of market forces and conventional wisdom and highlights alternatives. Labor
must no longer be viewed merely as a cost, but must be recognized as a key strategic component of
6any community, society and, business system.  Similarly, the role of financial resources and
entrepreneurial risk-taking must be recognized, together with the need for change in the role and
services provided by government.
While Swinney does not provide a detailed playbook for societal change, through his research and
analysis, he synthesizes an approach that transcends “politics as usual,” is  pragmatic but not naive,
possible but not ideologically rigid, and, most importantly, eminently desirable. His discussion paper
presents  provocative and radical ideas, which merit concentrated reading, and deep consideration.
Present societal trends give cause for great alarm, and cannot be allowed to continue. By default,
long term stewardship has been abandoned for short term benefits. We must quickly re-establish our
obligations to society and future generations.  Building the Bridge to the High Road provides a basis
for discussion and the development of a pro-active approach.
Peter Rogers
Chairman, Basildon Enterprises
August, 1998
7Foreword
This paper represents current elements of my strategic thinking that are a product of more than 30
years of social activism, mostly in the context of industrial companies and industrial/post-industrial
communities.  I have seen victories as well as defeats in my own work and in that of my peers and
colleagues.  Over the last 15 or 20 years, the defeats have been far more frequent than the victories.
And they have occurred in an environment that is increasingly unsettling.
Around me, and in most accounts I read, I see developments that are deeply disturbing and reflect a
deterioration in society and the human condition that would have been inconceivable 30 years ago.
The economic poverty and poverty of spirit that we see all around us were not described in Michael
Harrington’s The Other America. Yet in part in response to conditions described in that book, a War
on Poverty was launched by a president, reflecting an official policy of concern and a commitment of
resources to the eradication of poverty.  During that time, the intelligentsia and people of good will
made enormous personal sacrifices to come to know and to be of assistance to those who had less.
Social activists held each other to very high standards of accountability, particularly in demanding
that we  address core and causal issues.
Now, in the face of evidence to the contrary, we have official pronouncements  that we live in a
“dream economy” paraded in all the media outlets.  Allegedly our system has achieved a world-wide
victory.  With amazing ease, the intelligentsia  find comfort in studying and lauding the positive
qualities, actions,  and conditions of a smaller and smaller percentage of our domestic and
international population.  These statements inevitably serve to justify the decision to back away from
intellectual or material discomfort and risk.  From my perspective, it really is a story of the
Emperor’s New Clothes, and I am surprised and saddened by the faces I see in the cheering crowd.
That’s what I feel on my bad days.  On good days, and when I have analyzed what I have seen in my
daily work, this is clearly a time of deep transition.  Though the numbers are frightfully smaller than
I would wish, an emerging core of people from a variety of disciplines have come to a similar
conclusion, and are doing the intellectual and practical work that should pay off big time in about 30
years, while making more and more positive changes at the margins in the meantime.
Over the last two years, my organizational network has encouraged me to set forth in one place the
perspectives that have emerged from my experience, so that those who are interested might have
access to them.  Fortunately, this pressure coincided with the generosity of the Cooperative
Charitable Trust Forum.1  Members of the Forum have not only given me the encouragement I
needed, but bought the space and set the deadlines I needed to break from the demands of daily work
and get it done.   The comments and suggestions I received from Forum members as well as friends,
staff, colleagues, and family on the earlier drafts were essential for the quality of this final paper.
What is the value of this paper for the Forum?  As you will see, it is not exclusively on employee
ownership.  I advance a strategic vision that provides a framework for practical as well as intellectual
work.  Forum participants have all been active leaders in the kind of work that has given rise to this
vision.  For that, I am indebted.  You have acted with absolute creativity and courage in the arena
where efforts, by definition, are often the most complex.  You are where the rubber hits the road.
None of the ideas in this paper are worth anything if they aren’t effective in showing the immediate
power of a strategic vision at the place where work is done--at individual companies and workplaces.
One goal of the paper is to bring those we respect in the social movement closer to our side--to win
them away from their agnosticism in relation to our core commitment to apply our strategic vision at
the company level of the economy.  On the other hand, the demand of attention to detail and daily
tough decisions gives rise to a narrowness in vision and thought, even on the part of the
practitioner/leaders.  This paper is dedicated to giving you some determination and insight in
8guarding against that narrowness.  It is also meant to be an antidote to the Valium of our movement--
the mobility and financial and professional rewards that go to those with real skill, but that one way
or another tend to discourage critical thinking and political organizing.
9Chapter 1:  Introduction
On the 1000 block of North Michigan Ave. in Chicago, known as the Gold Coast, the 1995 per capita
annual income was $68,013.  Fifty blocks south, in a community known as Grand Boulevard, the per
capita annual income was $1,600.  The gap is increasing yearly, reflected in every appropriate type of
measure.
As summarized by Jeff Gates in The Ownership Solution:2
# Harvard University economic historians found that the share of the nation’s overall net worth held
by the wealthiest 1% of American households jumped from below 20% in 1979 to more than 36%
in 1989.
# The Federal Reserve and the Internal Revenue Service found that the net worth of the top 1% is
now greater than that of the bottom 90%.
# Census Bureau data in 1996 confirm that the gap between America’s haves and have-nots is the
widest since the end of World War II.
# Between 1989 and 1993, median household income in the United States fell more than 7% after
correcting for family size and inflation.  For those in the bottom tenth earning just above the
minimum wage--inflation-adjusted wages fell an astounding 16% between 1979 and 1989.
In a recent speech sponsored by the World Trade Center in Chicago, United Nations Secretary
General Kofi Annan commented on the globalization of the world economy and challenged the
common view that we are living in prosperous times.  He pointed out that 80% of world trade flows
among 12 countries.  Less than 5% of world trade involves Africa; and 100 countries are worse off
today than they were 15 years ago.
The “Human Development Report, 1996" by the United Nations Development Program, reported that
“the assets of 358 billionaires exceed the combined annual incomes of the countries with 45% of the
world’s people.”  More than 1 billion people saw their per capita income decline between 1980 and
1993.  The UNDP summarized, “Development that perpetuates today’s inequalities is neither
sustainable nor worth sustaining.”3
We are living in potentially very volatile times.  Behind the statistics of the income gap are horrific
social and human realities.  Despite claims to the contrary, we don’t live in a dream economy that is
the victory of capitalism.  American capitalism has returned to the “rich-get-richer legacy of turn-of-
the-century primitive capitalism...and...this trend...is non-sustainable”.4
This is also a time of tremendous concentration of wealth and power, reflected in  megamergers and
the incredible incomes of individual businessmen.  Critical decision making occurs farther and
farther away from the lives and influence of the overwhelming majority of the world’s people.  These
conditions will inevitably give rise to calls for a new order to end the misery and oppression of the
growing majority.  And some of the calls will take hold and move masses of people to action.
This is a period of great transition. Not only is big change possible, it is required. The question is
how long the transition will take and what will be the character of its various stages.  The answers
depend upon what we do intellectually, practically, and organizationally.
We are at the early stages of a major transition in our economy that will result in a truly new
paradigm of development.  It will take several decades.  Right now we must consciously and
patiently focus on the essential incremental moves forward.   Such a moment requires explanation
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and a description of why the old order is no longer adequate, as well as an outline of the general
features and terms of the new framework.
This paper is written to:
# advance the basic elements of a strategy that will lead us to a new stage of political, economic,
and social development,
# gather the analytical threads that have shaped this strategy,
# win over a core of intellectual and practical leaders to lead a movement around this strategic
vision through greater and more intentional coordination.
This paper advances the structure of a new approach with a few examples as illustration.  Each
section raises complicated issues that deserve much deeper and longer treatment. It is written to
encourage critical thinking and debate.  As good as those of us are in this reading audience, and as
hard as we work, we must acknowledge that negative factors are growing faster than positive ones in
our society.
The strategy is explored in the context of a web of values, pressures, and possibilities rooted in the
experience of the 1960s and the social movements for civil and human rights, participatory
democracy, and global justice.  The ideas in this paper emerge from the experiences, values, and
reflections of activists, organizers, developers, intellectuals, and leaders over the last 30 years.  These
men and women typically took inspiration from that tumultuous decade and applied it to a very
specific struggle around a very specific situation--thinking globally but acting locally.  But now those
lessons must be threaded into a more complex tapestry consistent with the angry ambition to change
the world, rather than finding a haven for mere survival.
The purpose of this paper is to introduce several key and contested strategic concepts to provoke
debate and discussion, and finally to help bring alignment among those who agree.
The key concepts.
1. A significant section of the business community has turned to speculative and short-term
investment, which has led to expanding destruction of the world’s productive capacity.   This
qualitative change in the forces of production is being driven, in part, by new information and
electronic technology.  This is what we call the Low Road. We now have the space and need for a
High Road vision of development.  The High Road seeks the best use of  human and material
resources and is made possible by values that affirm the broadest distribution of wealth and human
development as an objective of the economy.  The safety and development of all people is the realistic
objective of this strategy.
2.  The question of who guides and drives the production and control of wealth as well as its
redistribution is central to this strategy.  There must be a fundamental change in the social relations of
production and in those responsible for the creation and control of wealth and developing our
productive capacity. The strategy demands that the labor and community social movements transcend
the politics of opposition and the limits of advocating only redistribution of wealth.  Instead they must
take responsibility for the creation of wealth, the starting of companies and the creation of jobs,
welcoming the responsibility for good management, productivity, and efficiency as well as justice.
We recognize the positive aspects of the market and use them, just as we see and oppose its negative
aspects.
3.  The High Road strategy requires recognizing and working with all the stakeholders in the
company, the community, and the economy.  We embrace sections of the business community as
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tactical and strategic allies even as we identify and oppose those in the business community that
degrade our communities and the human condition.  In this context we recognize an important
distinction between those who seek a fair return through increasing our productive capacity and those
who seek it through speculation.
4.  We reject the “command” as well as the “neo-liberal” or “free-market” approaches to the
economy and government.   We are committed to economic democracy and an expanded level of
public participation in all aspects of society, and in all aspects of the economy.  This is essential for
the development of people as well as the success of our initiatives.  It must take place in the firm and
community, as well as in government and civil society. The High Road strategy also requires adoption
and development of the strategy in local, state, and federal government.  We must contend for the use
of all the power of the state to take the High Road strategy of development.
5.  We seek the mutual and equal development of all countries and communities. We see the absolute
necessity of viewing our work and responsibilities in the context of the international economy.
6.  Our strategy requires four organizational components at the community level:
# The enterprise development company, a center for the technical side of development.
# Linked enterprise networks that coordinate the activities of companies in a sector.
# The community umbrella organization that holds the development process accountable to
community needs.
# A political structure that will represent the development vision in the fight for control of
government and its resources.
Finally, this paper hopes to contribute to the gathering of a much larger and diverse group than we
have seen in a while to join in common work towards a more clearly defined common objective.  In
his provocative essay, “Where Do We Go From Here?” the Rev. Martin Luther King wrote,
"When a new dawn reveals a landscape dotted with obstacles, the time has come for sober reflection,
for assessment of our methods and for anticipating pitfalls.  Stumbling and groping through the
wilderness finally must be replaced by a planned, organized, and orderly march."
That must also be our task at this moment in history.
12
Chapter 2:  The Origins of the Analysis
This paper reflects a personal learning curve on the strategic questions we all face.  The personal
story is important to expose the origins of the ideas as well as to suggest a practical application.  My
story is not unique.  It shares elements woven deeply into a fabric of formative experience of millions
of people--the 1960s.
My background
I was raised by parents immersed in the best of the professional legacy of the New Deal.  They were
social workers in executive positions in the federal government, committed Christians, liberal
democrats, and committed to equality and internationalism.  Following a happy and non-descript
childhood in Northern Virginia, I went to Alma College in Michigan on my way to becoming a
veterinarian.  In March of 1965, when I was 20, a friend of mine had been encouraged by SNCC (the
Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee) to organize a solidarity demonstration in support of
the civil rights movement in Selma.  We planned a 50 mile march to Lansing, Michigan to present a
petition that polarized the campus.  It  resulted in a cross burning, fights between black and white
students, and a mass meeting of 200 in preparation for the march.  The next morning, 50 of us started
out, only to be hit by a blizzard and finally turned around by the State Police.
My curiosity and values had been challenged and changed.  I took a summer job in Atlanta and
immediately sought out the SNCC office, offering my talents as an envelope stuffer and stamp licker.
Volunteering as a chauffeur for a couple of veteran organizers led me to work in a school
desegregation project in DeKalb County, Ga.  A summer of community organizing followed, with a
typical experience in a southern jail.  Absorbing the intensity of that rural community was a turning
point in my life.
I transferred in 1965 to the University of Wisconsin and into the history department.  Madison was
one of the key centers for the anti-Vietnam War and student movements that became the center of my
life for the next four years.  I left Madison in 1968, moving to the industrial community of North
Chicago, Illinois where I continued my organizing work among young people and sailors at the Great
Lake Training Center.  Here I started what would be a 15-year period of factory jobs:  making paint,
making envelopes, assembling autos, in a bakery, on electronics assembly lines, and as a janitor.  I
operated a slitter to cut gaskets, operated centerless grinders cutting parts for appliances, and finally
settled into a 7-year job as a turret lathe operator.
I moved to Chicago in 1970.  I led a failed, three-year organizing drive to bring the United Electrical
Workers Union (UE) into Sunbeam.  I was fired.  Following a two-year job at another plant, I was
hired at Taylor Forge, a subsidiary of Gulf +Western in Cicero, an industrial suburb on Chicago’s
West Side.  This was 1975.  Taylor Forge made big pipe, fittings, and flanges for the Alaska pipeline
and big utility companies.  I hired in as an apprentice engine lathe operator and became a turret lathe
operator for most of my eight years at Taylor Forge.  I led the successful organizing drive to bring in
the Steelworkers Union, and served as Vice President of USWA Local 8787.  Unknown to me at that
time, G+W was at the cutting edge of new corporate strategies that were emerging with force in the
American economy of the late 1970s.  With a huge loan from Chase Manhattan Bank, G+W
purchased a number of manufacturing companies, including Taylor Forge, with the intent of "milking
the cash cow," as it was described in a Harvard Business School case study.  G+W had no long-term
strategy for the particular companies (or the products or the workers) it had purchased except to pull
out cash and value and to use the money to finance acquisitions in other, more lucrative sectors, like
entertainment--e.g., Paramount Pictures.  The short-term objective was the only concern. It was like
buying a car and never changing the oil.
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G+W began to close Taylor Forge department by department, never telling us what the strategy was.
To make matters worse, the executives suggested at the end that if we gave up part of our wages and
pensions, we might be able to save our jobs--testing our level of fear to see how much they could
squeeze out of us before they closed the doors.  This was 1982, when hundreds of companies were
closing in Chicago and thousands were losing their jobs.
With the growing number of plant closings, it was difficult to mobilize people.  Campaigns against
company demands were lost more frequently than they were won.  Companies asked for concessions
in wages, benefits, and working conditions, threatening to close unless they were granted. Union
locals and their members capitulated, legitimately afraid of losing their jobs and risking their future.
The same kind of fear among union members exists today.
I couldn't win my members’ support just by complaining about management’s greediness.  I needed
to prove that the union's position would neither wreck the company nor force a closing.  I needed
essentially to have my own business plan for the company that could prove that our demands for
wages and benefits could be supported and that the company could make a reasonable profit.  I didn't
have the plan, nor did the Steelworkers have a strategy, so Taylor Forge closed, and I lost my job in
1983.
G+W shareholders made a ton of money and the corporation continued to expand.  Cicero--the town
that had been home to Taylor Forge for several decades--was to lose 50% of its job base in the next
six years as other companies, also, closed.
The Center for Labor and Community Research
I founded the Center for Labor and Community Research, originally named the Midwest Center for
Labor Research, in 1982 along with other local leaders in the Steelworkers Union and several
community organizers and supportive academics, to provide the kind of research and analysis that I
had needed at Taylor Forge, and for unions, communities and others concerned about saving jobs and
stabilizing our economy.  CLCR made several key plans:
# To focus on the micro-level of the economy--the firm and the community, engaging in in-depth
research as a foundation of information for grassroots community and labor organizations and local
government.
# To concentrate our efforts in working class and poor communities, working with all the
constituencies of those communities;
# To define “labor” as people who worked, and to serve those who were organized and unorganized.
We were uncertain about our future strategies and how we could respond to the economic transition
unfolding in front of us.  We began by looking at hundreds of companies in Chicago that had closed
or were in danger of closing.  Chicago lost 3,000 of 7,000 companies in the 1980s and 150,000 basic
manufacturing jobs, so we had a lot at which to look.
The prevailing and powerful view then, as now, is that this chain of events and its consequences was
painful and destructive in many ways, but inevitable.  The logic was, and is, that we live in a new
global economy witnessing a fundamental change in the international division of labor.  The new role
for the United States is as a source of intelligence, information, and finance.  The Third World with
its low-cost labor will be the center for making things.  Then there is this new complex and powerful
communication technology.....the new Information Age.....the end of work......the new service
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economy....and so forth.
The prescription from this logic is that you cannot do anything about these wrenching problems but
accept them, so it’s best to find a niche that gives you the best chance to survive under the best terms
you can get.  For the overwhelming majority of the population this means getting by on less, and for
the bottom 20% it means getting by on much less.  The implications of this thinking resonate in every
aspect of cultural, social, and political life.
At CLCR, we were overwhelmed by what we were witnessing, but felt that this notion of
inevitability needed to be examined in the context of the specific companies and communities so
obviously at risk.  Of course, we found a few companies that really needed to close--the equivalents
of slide-rule producers.  Their products or technology were completely out of date and there was no
way they could compete in the new marketplace.  The historian Elting Morrison writes about the
tendency of organizations and communities to “fight like hell to stay the same” and to deny the kind
of destruction that is a precondition for new development.  It is a strength of a system to let obsolete
things die.  When we found companies whose product was actually obsolete, we told labor and the
community the truth, so no one invested in trying to do the impossible.
On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of companies that we examined were not obsolete.
They were at risk because of problems that could be solved in the context of our economy under our
current system.  Some of the problems are simple and require straightforward solutions; others are
more complex.  I estimate that we could have saved 75% of the jobs and companies lost in the 1980s
with some creativity and determination by labor, community, government, and business.
Big Companies--often the economic anchor for a community
Headlines about the crisis in the industrial community focused on the large corporations--the big
steel mills, the auto companies, the large manufacturing centers.  This was the beginning of a period
referred to by some as the “casino economy.”  Transnational and large corporations began to acquire
other companies and frequently pursued short-term, profit-generating strategies that benefitted
shareholders, but resulted in moving or closing firms that had been anchors of the local economy and
the foundation for local employment.  Transnational takeovers eliminated 80,000 jobs in the Chicago
area during the 1980's.
As we researched these companies, typically in anticipation of their shutdown, we found troubling
patterns.  Stewart Warner, an anchor of a northside community in Chicago, is a good example.
Stewart Warner
Workers represented by the United Electrical Workers asked us for assistance when management at
Stewart Warner demanded concessions in contract negotiations.  A quick investigation showed a far
deeper and more serious problem than labor costs.  An aging board of directors was paying out 200%
of earnings as dividends to shareholders.   There was a lot of cash and no long-term debt.  There had
been a complete deterioration of preventive maintenance and capital improvements in the plant.
Production workers saw the competition developing new product lines like digital speedometers while
their company continued to produce outmoded needle speedometers.  The local Crain’s Chicago
Business said that business and investment community gossip had it that the owners had lost interest
in maintaining the company and were looking for a way out.
We told the workers that even if they gave up all their wages, they still wouldn’t save their jobs unless
they addressed the problems in management and the priorities of the owners.  The plant was clearly
going to be placed on the market, and we advised the union to seek to buy it.  We saw this as the best
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way to save their jobs, as our research had concluded that this company could continue to operate
profitably in Chicago.  However, the activist local was fearful of such a complicated step and believed
that employee ownership would be a “corrupting” practice for workers.  Within a year, the company
was purchased by BTR Plc., a British conglomerate with a habit of buying US companies and closing
them or moving production to the Maquiladora Zones in Mexico.
With the assistance of CLCR, a local entrepreneur, Tim Wright, made a bid on the company, and a
coalition of organizations including the union and local political figures fought for a City Council
resolution that would use eminent domain to keep the company in local hands.  The effort failed.
Within a couple of years, part of production was moved to Mexico, the plant was demolished, and the
land was sold to a local developer who put high-end condos on the site.
CLCR research found that after two years, this closing had cost the broader community:
# 2,500 additional jobs in other segments of the local economy;
# $10 million in federal, state, and local taxes;
# $13.2 million in unemployment and welfare benefits; and
# $24 million in consumer spending.
The total cost to the public was more than $47 million when a realistic business plan could have
sustained the company as a profitable source of income and investment dollars for the Chicago
economy.
Gentrification--closing factories and using the space for upscale housing-- cost this local community
40,000 industrial jobs over a 15-year period.  CLCR documented a number of closings in the Chicago
area and the Midwest that had similar characteristics.
Small companies slipping through the cracks in the market:
Never making it to the headlines were the closing, in the 1980s, of hundreds of small companies,
each with a handful of employees.  In 1986, Gladys Scott, a resident of the Hyde Park community on
Chicago’s South Side, called CLCR with alarming information about a printing company--Bankers
Print--that had handled her printing needs for more than 16 years.  The owner, Carl Wilson, had
cancer and no heir to take over the business.
After meeting with Mr. Wilson and talking with the employees, we were able to arrange an employee
purchase of the company--a successful conclusion that no one had seen as an alternative.  The
experience focused our attention on small companies.  After all, despite public perception to the
contrary, 90% of all manufacturing companies are not big, complex, fully integrated firms.
Individually they are economically and socially insignificant, but in their aggregate they are the
bedrock of the manufacturing economy.   With 100 employees or fewer, they typically have local
markets, adequate technology, and a skilled work force.  They are frequently  linked to the larger
companies who do represent two-thirds of the employees in manufacturing, providing services and
materials for production.  The health of these small companies is a major variable in the success or
failure of the larger companies and the community.
On behalf of the Economic Development Commission of Chicago, in a study funded by the
MacArthur Foundation, CLCR looked at 800 of these small companies with an owner 55 or older,
and found that almost 40% were at risk of closing because of the issue of succession.1  A typically
successful white entrepreneur2 would move to the suburbs as his wealth made it possible, often
encouraged by the shift of their community from white to African American or Hispanic.  Facing
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sickness, death, or retirement, he would be unable to find a successor in his family or in management
to take over the company, which would be difficult to sell because of its size and location.  Typically,
the father turns to the son, and doesn’t consider the daughter.  The son typically would not want to go
back into the “ghetto” to run the company.  Even if the son had gone to business school, he would
want to make money in the “casino economy” by moving stocks and bonds or working as an MBA
for a large Fortune 500 corporation.
Virtually everyone we have met in our work has anecdotes like this scenario--a failure of the market
that reflects issues of race, class, and available productive capacity.  In this scenario, everyone loses
unnecessarily.
# The family that owns the business gets liquidation value--typically 20%--rather than the full
value of the business and their lifetime investment.
# The local economy loses a cost-effective provider of goods and services.
# The local community loses good paying jobs.
# Local people with entrepreneurial talent lose an opportunity to take over an existing healthy
business with a market, adequate technology, a skilled workforce, and a history.  If they are minority
entrepreneurs, they are offered instead an “opportunity” in the typically low-margin retail economy, or
they are picked up by community development corporations and trained on how to do business plans
for start-up businesses that typically have a high failure rate.
# Individuals who lose jobs--meaning a productive social environment, good wages, and good
benefits--too often then confront life’s challenges without income or on welfare.  In short, these are
typically not members of communities that benefit from the so-called dream economy, but
communities with soaring unemployment rates.
Yet this problem can be solved with conventional resources and a little creativity and extra effort by
those concerned with community development.  Small companies with aging owners and no
successors can be identified in a number of different ways.  They are often good opportunities for
employee buyouts, as was the case with Bankers Print, or they are an excellent opportunity for
aspiring local entrepreneurs who are typically African American and Hispanic, heretofore excluded
from this kind of opportunity.
Towards a New Vision of Community Development
Our experience found exactly these kinds of problems behind the statistics of massive de-
industrialization in urban and some rural communities.  The resulting and explosive growth of
poverty in these communities became the material foundation for the pathology that screams at us in
our daily news papers, on the television, in our culture, and in our politics.  Harvard professor
William Julius Wilson drew this connection in his work, The Truly Disadvantaged.3
The founding of CLCR coincided with the movement to elect Harold Washington mayor of the city
of Chicago.  Some of us were active in the campaign, startled by its success, and pulled into the
effort to rebuild the city, guided by a rush of new creativity and willingness to engage new
approaches in the field of community development.  From City Hall, labor was viewed as an
essential component of development, not just a cost or an obstacle.  Industrial retention and
community involvement in the economy was a goal.  As a result, CLCR was hired by the City’s
Department of Economic Development and introduced to the field of community development--a
language and experience new to us from the labor movement.
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For six or seven years, CLCR focused principally on the concerns, problems, and solutions of
individual firms.  We became familiar with the ways that jobs and companies could be saved.  We
were introduced to simple but critical problems in companies that could be solved if they were
identified before they became crises.  CLCR developed the basic features of our labor/community-
based early warning system that would expand our source of information about individual firms.4
We became familiar with worker and minority ownership, the power of the purchase, the
requirements of coalitions and the essentials of campaigns.  As we gained confidence in our ability to
save companies and jobs, we began to look at the power of this approach in the context of a broader
community and in relationship to different aspects of the community economy.
In Chicago, I had been deeply influenced by the work of Dan Luria and Jack Russell, policy analysts
who had developed a comprehensive alternative vision for the Detroit economy following the
collapse of the auto industry.  Their approach had a sophisticated view of the human and physical
resources created by the auto industry, and proposed development of these resources with a creative
mix of traditional and non-traditional market initiatives.5  Luria was a speaker at one of our
conferences on employee ownership.  We also learned about innovative international models for
development that reflected our commitments to manufacturing, cooperative ownership, and powerful
links to the community.  These included the Mondragon network in the Basque region of Spain and
the flexible manufacturing networks of Northern Italy.  These efforts increased the breadth of our
vision in looking at our own community.
CLCR came into much closer contact with “community development.”  I participated in a year-long
program with the Development Training Institute that gathered leading theorists as well as
technicians in the field and transferred their skills and knowledge to local practitioners like myself.
We began to see how leaders actually operated in communities and companies.  What we found was
disturbing.  While we gained respect for many of the individuals and their motivations and found a
number of organizations doing very good and creative work, the field seemed to us to be deliberately
avoiding obvious opportunities.  We saw:
# an avoidance of manufacturing and a negative view of organized labor;
# a passive, uncritical relationship with the private sector and the absence of an entrepreneurial
approach; and
# a very weak link, if any, to the activist organizations in the community, and deliberate avoidance
of controversial issues such as the relationship between rich and poor.
We found some strong leaders, some effective organizations, and some excellent allies.  But the
weaknesses were widespread and all-pervasive as problems in the community continued to multiply.
In 1991, I co-authored a paper, “Towards a New Vision of Community Economic Development,”
with Miguel Vasquez of the Center for Community Change in Washington, DC, and Howard
Engelskirchen of Western State University in Fullerton, California.  We advanced this critique of the
community development field and outlined a different approach.6  We organized a conference around
the paper for some 200 people who were typically practitioners in the field and eager for more
critical reflection and debate.
Since then, we have continued to search out others who share our concerns--organizers, practitioners
of various sorts, intellectuals and academics, political and constituency leaders representing diverse
social and political interests--people who feel the need to weave their particular agenda and
experience into an effective alternative to the traditional development paradigm.  We further
developed these themes and tensions by taking part in
other organizations including the Federation for Industrial Retention and Renewal,7 the Chicago-
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based Poverty Task Force,8 the Midwest Consortium for Economic Development Alternatives,9 and
Sustainable America.10
A much broader range of discussion and work by individuals, organizations, and networks is
happening internationally, giving strength to all of those involved.  Through CLCR’s work with
individual companies and communities, and within the various efforts to create a viable organization
committed to a new paradigm of development, CLCR has developed what seems to us to be a
coherent and effective strategic framework.
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Chapter 3: The World Changed
The End of an Era
In "Showdown for Nonviolence," an article written by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. that appeared after
his assassination in 1968, he called for a large national demonstration that would begin in several
states and move towards Washington, D.C..  It would, he said,
"...dramatize the whole economic problem of the poor...[even if] this action may take on disruptive
dimensions...We need an economic bill of rights. This would guarantee a job to all people who want
to work and are able to work.  It would also guarantee an income for all who are not able to work. "
When King was writing this article, the American economy was far different from what it is today.
We were in the era of expansion that followed World War II and lasted until the late 1970s.  There
was wealth that could be spread around and a power structure that was willing to spread it, within
limits.  That was the period when the “squeaky wheel got the grease”--an assumption shared by every
effective leader within the popular movement.  When enough people protested, there was a War on
Poverty.  King could call for a guaranteed annual income with confidence.  In a speech to the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference in 1967 titled, “Where Do We Go From Here?”, he said:
"The assistant director of the Office of Economic Opportunity declared that the long-range costs of
adequately implementing programs to fight poverty, ignorance and slums will reach one trillion
dollars.  He was not awed or dismayed by the prospect but instead pointed out that the growth of the
gross national product during the same period makes this expenditure comfortably possible.  It is, he
said, as simple as this: ‘The poor can stop being poor if the rich are willing to become even richer at a
slower rate.'"
King could have the confidence that the stewards of the American economy were basically doing a
good job in creating wealth and building our productive capacity. The only question was what share
African Americans and all poor people could have of this wealth.
This was also the period when the saying, "What’s good for General Motors is good for the USA"
had a ring of truth to it.  GM paid decent wages and its companies were continually hiring.  An auto
worker could hold the same job for 30 years and retire with a decent pension and benefits.  A lot of
African Americans entered the middle class through autoworker jobs.  GM paid its taxes.  Flint
prospered.  It had a decent product and used new technology effectively.    Of course, inequalities
and injustices did go along with this social contract, and GM, like a lot of American corporations,
was wealthy and fat.  But there was a closer connection between GM and other big corporations and
their search for
profits, and the development of productive capacity and the community's economic stability.
This same connection was not extended into the international arena.  In fact, the opposite was the
case.  U.S. companies, with the assistance of our government, had enormous access to the wealth,
markets, and productive resources of other countries under terms imposed by us and backed by the
use of our military might.  This was a major reason our domestic economy continued to grow and
prosper and our social contract was so generous, even periodically rewarding a social movement
focused on redistribution of wealth.
Profound Breakthroughs in Technology
The emergence of the microchip and new electronic information technology began to transform
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social, economic, and political relations in the 1960s.  It has offered new possibilities for
development on a par with the advent of the plow, the steam engine, and electricity.  It offers
incredible potential to revolutionize production as well as to provide access to information and ideas
in virtually every corner of the world. Its promise of accelerating human development is enormous.
Scientific inquiry can sort and store information in seconds that would have required months with
traditional technologies.
On the other hand, the power of this new technology to reverse human development is equally
available.  A Low Road development strategy could use it to minimize the role of human labor in
production and drive people out of jobs.  The opportunity to shift capital from one speculative
investment to the other at a mind-boggling scale is almost unlimited.
Access to information and ideas includes the ability of those who sell products that degrade or
damage the human condition to penetrate homes and communities with reactionary and demeaning
concepts--whether or not the community or home is ready.  On the other hand, access to all
information is becoming universal, as is the ability to communicate in real time across borders.  A
combined use of satellite and computer technology could give every village in the world access to an
almost unlimited supply of information--leapfrogging the need for books or traditional electrification.
Large multinational companies benefit, as do labor and social movements eager for international
contact, and the demands of the production and use of the technology require an excellent
educational infrastructure and collaborative production methods.
It depends on what values and priorities guide technology’s use and development. In all aspects of
society, this new technology has become a powerful force and context for change--positive and
negative.
The Global Economy Changed
The world never stays the same.  American international dominance and the corresponding benefit to
the American people began to shift in the context of a complex mix of factors.  Beginning with the
Korean conflict and punctuated by the American defeat in Vietnam, a growing challenge to
American companies coincided with the emergence of new knowledge and communication
technologies and with the increasing strength of the international business community.  The results
for our economy were:
# a surge in effective global competition;
# a tremendous increase in the concentration of power and decision making in the hands of a few
people;
# an increase in the mobility of capital through technological advances, the abandonment of the
Bretton Woods agreement, and the reduction of exchange controls;
# a falling rate of profit in key industries, particularly after 1970;
# the emergence of opportunities to make substantial returns in speculation, arbitrage and other
short-term investment strategies; and
# traditional factors that generated pressure: changing markets, poor management, and product and
process obsolescence.  These became more significant in a tighter international market.
In this context, the commitment of the business community to the social contract began to change.
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First, it became increasingly difficult to maintain the old rates of profit in the new global economy.
Many new competitors rose to the challenges offered by capitalist competition and became more
innovative and creative than their sleepy and stumbling American counterparts, who had been lulled
by decades of their own dominance and confidence.  The Japanese, the Brazilians, the Germans and
others made enormous headway in challenging our traditional strength in certain market sectors. The
battle in the marketplace intensified and the casualties--particularly in the U.S.--began to increase.
New developments in productive capacity, particularly in Third World countries, and flexibility and
speed offered by new technologies and expanded information then created opportunities for flight
and international investment that had not been possible in earlier decades.  New capital investment
shifted to the Third World, particularly from Japan and those U.S. industries competing with
Japanese firms.
And So Did American Society
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, those of us in labor and community organizations began to notice
these changes at home.  In response to shifts in the international economy, American companies
began to sell the store rather than rise to the challenges of competition the way that “free market”
ideologues had promised that they would.  Instead of  making a better product or producing in more
efficient ways, companies shifted production to areas of low-cost non-union labor--the South,
Mexico, or Asia.
Business Week published an alarming exposé titled “The Hollow Corporation.”11  Rather than make a
product, managers learned how to gamble with a company’s assets to make money.  Those who
owned and managed America's productive capacity--the factories that made communities like Flint,
MI or the Chicago’s Austin neighborhood the healthiest communities in the country--began to
abandon companies, industry sectors, and entire industrial communities.  We were eventually
surrounded by stacks of  bones, up and down streets that had been busy and prosperous for years.
In Chicago, once-healthy companies that had been a foundation for a healthy economy disappeared.
Sunbeam had moved south looking for low-cost labor.   Leaf Confectionery was purchased and then
closed by a Finnish conglomerate that changed its production strategy.  Playskool operated profitably
in Chicago until it was bought by Hasbro, which borrowed City money at below-market rates and
then moved to a site in Rhode Island where it could make more money.  Stewart Warner  was
purchased and closed by British Tire and Rubber which then made a killing in the Chicago real estate
market.  And Schwinn Bicycle was closed by Eddie Schwinn, who found it cheaper to sub-contract
the production of  bicycles off-shore.  This move cost Chicago’s West Side 1,500 jobs at a time that
other American companies were developing new domestic bike markets and expanding domestic
production.
Corporate actions, in short, began to destroy the productive capacity that had made a healthy
economy possible.  As companies downsized, closed, or moved away on such a massive scale, we
witnessed cannibalization. Without jobs, people began to lose the skills and discipline essential for
work.  Normally in industry, a structure allows for the passing of skills and perspectives from the
older generation to the younger generation.  That learning cycle was smashed, destroying critical
information necessary for rebuilding the local economy.  As income declined, so did tax revenues
and the local infrastructure that was supported by public dollars.  Adding insult to injury, the
companies frequently blamed the community or the people who worked for them for their problems,
when facts frequently demonstrated that the company’s values and narrow priorities were the source
of the slide.
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U.S. Steel
The corporate symbol of the late 1970s became U.S. Steel. It dramatically cut productive capacity
against the advice of its own think tank, the Iron and Steel Institute.   The steel industry was the most
profitable in the world.  In 1979, it was generally making a 7% return.  At the same time, its Japanese
counterparts were comfortable with a much lower rate of return combined with a long-term horizon.
In those days an investor could make a 14% return in the money market.  U.S. Steel CEO David
Roderick, summed it up when he said, "We are in the business to make money, not steel."
The corporation invested its capital into the oil industry and shopping markets, changed its name, and
blamed its company’s problems on “greedy” steelworkers.  During the decades when it dominated the
international steel market, U.S. Steel had refused to re-invest an adequate percentage of profits into
the industry or even into the new technologies that it had invented.  Meanwhile, Japanese, Brazilian,
British and German steelmakers embraced those technologies and methods of production and made
tremendous gains in market share in the industry. The result:  the loss of hundreds of thousands of
jobs and the destruction of vital steel communities.
US Steel changed its name to its stock market symbol “USX” and became the symbol of the emerging
Low Road strategy in contrast to what was in part the historic High Road strategy of GM.  The change
in symbol also reflected the dramatic change in U.S. Steel commitment to the traditional social
contract with the domestic economy, to domestic productive capacity, and to the employees and
communities that had made its success possible.  Roderick’s actions were not required by the market
in order for his business to survive or even thrive.  His actions reflected his values, priorities and
narrow self-interest, and his view of what would maximize shareholder return.
Influential sections of the business community have increasingly abandoned the obligations of
stewardship for our economy that undergirded the social contract of the 20th century.   Rather than
working to increase the productive capacity of key industries and the standard of living, they pursued
strategies that led to the destruction of productive capacity as well as a dramatic decline in the
standard of living for the average worker and a skewed distribution of wealth.  As described in the
New York Times, America’s production in the non-farm business sector rose by more than 2% a year,
on average, for a full century--from the 1870s until the early 1970s.  That average was pulled up by
the “golden age” after World War II, since 1973, the average has been only about 1%.1
Coinciding with this shift was a well-documented offensive by some major companies and their
political allies against labor, an attack on the social wage and safety net, and the shift of wealth from
the poor and middle class to the upper 20%.  This was most recently punctuated by the “reform”
(really repeal) of welfare. Unchallenged by the passive conventional strategies of government and the
community development industry, the anarchy inherent in our economy expanded.  Relatively
straightforward problems went unaddressed--succession of ownership in small firms, vocational
education and training, maintenance of the physical infrastructure, and maintaining a safe and stable
environment.  The shredding of the urban economic and industrial infrastructure continued.
Some Things Remained the Same
If people of color and women were on the margins during the dynamic and expansion period of the
American economy, they suffered in a dramatically disproportionate way in the general shift to the
Low Road.  While the President, Alan Greenspan, and the major media outlets sing the praises of the
“Dream Economy,” we have zones occupied by people of color in both urban and rural areas that
have the social and economic characteristics of some of the poorest countries in the developing
world: soaring unemployment rates, cruel infant mortality rates, hunger and homelessness, and all the
forms of social pathology that accompany extreme poverty.
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While Mayor Daley is praised for his school reform efforts in Chicago, barely 100 African American
students graduated from Robeson High School out of  nearly 500 incoming freshmen in 1998.  Only
30 years after the modern Civil Rights Movement, we see a consistent attack on affirmative action,
while African American participation in elite schools such as the University of California/Berkeley
declines dramatically, and we have the policies of mass incarceration of Black and Latino youth that
have put the United States in a league of its own.
In every aspect of society and the economy, race remains an indicator of inequality, discrimination,
and oppression.  This is equally true for women who remain in the lowest-wage service and retail
jobs and who face special suffering in the cutting of the social safety net that was called “Welfare
Reform”.
An End to the Traditional Social Contract
The generally accepted assumption is that the economy should serve and promote the development of
people and their communities.  While this seemed to be the case for the first three quarters of the
twentieth century, it has clearly not been so  during the last 25 years.  The traditional social contract
and paradigm of development that preserved economic power and initiative in exchange for a share
of the wealth is no longer viable.  We now have both a continued decline in real wages and a
deterioration of our social institutions, as well as a dramatic decline in our productive capacity.
Our communities, our countries, and our world face deterioration in all aspects of life for the
majority of people.  There is growing damage to our physical environment.  There is increasing
economic, social, and political instability.  This change in the commitment of a powerful segment of
the private sector requires a fundamental change in the social relations of production and the
paradigm of development.
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Chapter 4:  There Really Is Another Way
History is full of examples of people tolerating the cruelest conditions of life for decades or even
centuries.  People do not organize for change just because they are oppressed or exploited. They
organize for something. It is not until they are effectively presented a positive alternative that seems
achievable that they act in ways that make change possible.  This is particularly true of organizing
efforts focused on bringing about fundamental change--or, in the language of today, a new paradigm.
It’s not enough to have the objective conditions.  The subjective conditions must also exist--effective
leaders and organizations armed with an appropriate vision and program.
Traditional Frameworks for Change
A growing number of leaders and organizers were coming to believe that the conditions of the
economy and society in the 1970s and 1980s were not inevitable, and that the objective situation
required a new paradigm of development.  However,  it was also clear that the conventional
approaches to fundamental change had serious, if not fatal, flaws.  To earn mass support, the
strengths of each framework would need to be recognized and sustained in our search for an
approach that was practical and consistent with our social vision.
At least three contending approaches to fundamental change have flaws that must be addressed as we
create the space for a new paradigm of development.
! The Socialist Vision
! The Social Democratic Vision
! The Single-Issue Approach
The Socialist Vision:
The socialist vision inspired leaders of huge U.S. movements for change in the 1930s and 1940s, and
again in the 1960s and 1970s.  It gave many domestic organizers hope that if they could achieve
power in one form or another, there was a tested system that worked and could be imported and
applied in the restructuring of our society.  This was a vision worthy of sacrifice--death and loss of
physical safety, the loss of a job, and the endless difficult, meetings that always accompany
movements with big ambitions.
The socialist vision had, and still has, enormous strengths.   It has contributed and continues to
contribute to the development of society.  But where it was represented by a command economy and
a command state or movement, it was  compromised and failed.  Its weaknesses have become
painfully apparent with the collapse of most socialist command economies and societies, and the
ensuing fragmentation and marginalization of the left.  Two fatal errors were at the heart of this
decline.  First was the failure to develop adequately the democratic aspect of the state, the society,
and the economy.  The command state and party were profoundly coercive and restrictive, failing to
educate and motivate citizens in creative and constructive development.
The second fatal error was a wrongheaded perception of the role of the market. The socialist
command economy resulted in enormous waste and plummeting productivity, and suppressed
entrepreneurial talent at the ground level of the economy.  The productivity potential of socialism
remained a hollow slogan buried in a pile of heavily subsidized, bureaucratized shells.
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The “market” was often equated with capitalism and was only recognized for its negative aspects.
Markets have been around for 10,000 years, or since humankind developed enough surplus product
to exchange.  Markets and market pressures have always had their strengths and weaknesses, their
positives and negatives, and each system has recognized and used its strengths, while addressing the
weaknesses according to its own values and priorities.  That was true for slave and feudal systems,
and it is also true for capitalist and socialist systems.
Markets and market pressures are part of the objective features of society and cannot be wished
away, ignored, or crushed.  Some on the left may hate to hear it, but to ignore this truth stifles
effective leadership at the micro level of the economy--in the companies where production, work,
socialization, and education take place.
The Social Democratic Vision:
The social democratic vision--best demonstrated in policies that have guided European governments
and movements--has also failed to  provide a framework to inspire legions of grass roots leaders and
organizations around a vision for restructuring the economy and society.  The strength of this
international vision is that it has guided governments in power, and in some circumstances, has had
enormous influence in all aspects of life in many countries.
At least four major international trends of social democratic thinking exist, each with different
characteristics:  the Northern European, the Southern European, the Latin American, and the North
American.   Of these, the North American is by far the weakest, remaining largely the property of
academics and the intelligentsia, and influential only in relatively small and narrow circles.  Its
politics have been typically within the Democratic Party and focused on incremental changes.
Despite a commitment to the social wage, broader access to expanded social services, and a broader
democracy, social democrats have remained identified with the “command economy.”  Their tri-
partite democracy brings together big business with big government and big labor, essentially
seeking to create capitalism with a human face.  As a result, the philosophy hasn’t reached close
enough to the ground to provide the kind of transformative experience in communities, companies
and organizations that lead to flexibility and innovation.  A broad democratic vision that doesn’t
extend to the micro level of society and the economy in day-to-day activity misses the opportunity to
train people and organizations in the skills essential to building and protecting a productive,
democratic society.
The Single-Issue Approach:
Over the last 20 years, many activists of the 1960s, in part because of the failure of the that decade’s
political fights, returned to single-issue, grassroots work.  They sought to be closer to the people and
to offer practical options.  They focused on a very particular approach as a springboard for social
change.  They include those who think that worker ownership or cooperatives will provide the
inspiration to transform society, or that new-age business practices will capture the imagination of
those in power and lead to transformation, or that a “green” agenda with a pristine character will lead
to an apocalyptic moment of change in society.  There are others.
Each current has its own considerable strength, particularly in its focus, but together and separately,
they fall short. They lack the comprehensive programmatic and organizational vision that is essential
in mobilizing the kind of support essential for systemic change.  Their principal weakness lies in
seeing their particular vantage point as “The Strategy” rather than as an essential component or
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tactical option within what must be a broader vision.
A New Approach Emerging
CLCR emerged from discussions among local organizers sensing the need for deeper and more
comprehensive understanding of the options for CLCR’s main constituency--at that time, unionized
workers.  The loss of thousands of jobs combined with the political atmosphere of the Reagan era
rewrote all the rules of organizing, building union organization, contract negotiations, and fights with
the company. CLCR had to start over and dig deep into the details of what was going on in the
industrial economy and in the workplace.
Like other networks of organizers from the 1960s, CLCR applied and developed  intellectual,
strategic, and technical skills within the context of a  particular community, a particular issue, and a
particular constituency.  Our setting was the labor and community movement to retain industrial jobs.
CLCR’s focus for the last 16 years has been on investigating and experimenting with approaches to
creating a contemporary strategic analysis and tactical framework.  For this movement, we have
explored such issues as worker ownership, acquisitions, and the
various components of community development, trying to find out if these issues were dead ends or
part of an emerging and useful strategy for labor and communities.
Others of our political generation went into community organizing, housing, community
development, the women’s movement, the environmental movement, or local government.   Our
collective experience contributed to building our new paradigm for management and development of
the economy, and standards for our own professional lives that are consistent with our social and
political values.
The effort has taken much longer than we would have predicted.  Nonetheless,  in the course of  the
last 15-20 years, the scaffolding has slowly risen for a working  analysis of our economy and an
approach to economic development that can work--that can solve practical, everyday problems in the
company, in the community, or in society, and is consistent with our 1960s social vision.
From Business Experience
An enormous contribution to this new vision emerged from the experience of workers, unions,
managers, and technical and financial consultants as they helped establish worker-owned and
worker-operated companies as one response to the emerging industrial crisis in the late 1970s.  Prior
to the restructuring of American industry, and notwithstanding the rich European and Canadian
experience, worker ownership was generally relegated to the “candle and sandal” sector of the
economy--a small utopian option for the margins.  The field has gained enormous experience through
trial and error and is now changing the way mainstream businesses are owned and managed, bringing
new values and priorities into decisions on production.
This field includes attorneys, accountants, managers, investors, business analysts, educators and
trainers, policy advocates, labor leaders, and bankers.  Within the 10,000-plus Employee Stock
Ownership Plans (ESOPs) involving 9 million employees2 are hundreds of companies that are
engaged in deliberate and complicated efforts to change how production is managed.  A huge
network now exists of producer, agricultural, and consumer cooperatives.  There is now a wealth of
practical experience in this field.
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In the United States and Canada, many new investment funds have been guided by social screens
reflecting activist values and priorities.  These included Working Assets, Shorebank, and new funds
linked to the American labor movement.  In Canada, labor-initiated investment funds committed to
local and employee ownership now represent $4 billion of the $7 billion venture capital pool.  These
funds reflect a substantial amount of experience on the part of bankers, financial analysts, investment
analysts, and government in shaping some of the features needed in a new approach to development.
Thousands of small companies have also been started by social activists who, with a few bucks and a
quirky idea, became entrepreneurs and were successful:  Ben and Jerry’s Ice Cream,  the Body Shop
and People’s Express, to name three.  In the last 15 years, entrepreneurs have emerged who explicitly
link their social vision to the details of their business and who, with as much creativity as they can
muster, try to walk their talk within the restraints of successful companies.  These companies have
created their own networks such as Social Venture Network and Businesses for Social
Responsibility, and collectively seek to influence private sector and public policy.  Within high
technology firms and other new sectors, traditional values are now an impediment to productivity and
profitability and are being replaced with innovative approaches to management and production.
Within the walls of thousands of companies, entrepreneurs are gaining experience the hard way, and
that experience will be an essential component of new paradigm approaches.
Equal Exchange
Equal Exchange is a for-profit company, headquartered in Massachusetts, and is engaged in the
business of food importing, manufacturing, and distribution--primarily coffee.  It is owned and
operated by its 30 employees, and supported by another 200 shareholders.  It has annual sales of $5
million.  Equal Exchange buys its coffee directly from farm cooperatives in Tanzania, Mexico, Costa
Rica, Guatemala and other Latin American countries.  The beans are purchased at a minimum price of
$1.26 per pound based on the calculation that this is the minimum price that allows sustainability of
the farm cooperatives.  That price is paid, regardless of the world market price.
The company was founded in 1986 as a demonstration project in designing, organizing, and operating
a holistic business--one based on the principle of fairness to all stakeholders of the business: suppliers,
investors, employees, customers, and the environment.  The founders’ purpose was to facilitate more
direct trading relationships between consumers and producers.3  As company executive Clark
Arrington declared at the recent annual conference of Sustainable America, “Our goal isn’t just to
make profits, but to change the world.”
From the  Labor Movement
Labor has been the setting for some of the most important changes in any institution in the last 50
years, on exactly the issues that are the subject of this paper.  At the end of the 1970s, mainstream
labor was dominated--in fact imprisoned--by defenders of the old paradigm.  Major unions were
recognized for the strength of their bureaucracies and their
stubborn resistance to internal and external change rather than as a progressive economic force.
Unions were the predictable partners of the owners of industry and remained loyal partners even
when the fissures in the traditional post-war social contract began to widen into chasms.  Yet because
they were labor unions, they were among the major casualties of the shift--losing millions of
members and witnessing double digit declines in the percentage of workers they represented. But this
hole, far from becoming a grave, as some of the ideologues in business and government had hoped,
became a cauldron of change.
Veteran and emerging leaders began to fight for a new order within local and international unions.
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The Steelworkers Union shifted from accepting concessions in wages and benefits for the promise of
jobs that never returned, to being a leading union in the promotion of sophisticated capital strategies.
More than 20 large employee buyouts saved thousands of Steelworker’s jobs and their communities.
The International Ladies Garment Workers Union initiated the Garment Industry Development
Corporation (GIDC) in New York City that sought effective partnerships with government and
owners, restoring a sector challenged by the fabled dollar-a-day Asian garment worker.  GIDC
initiated training, technology, marketing and export programs that have saved jobs and companies
and provided a model for other union leaders.  “Sector initiatives” have now emerged in 10 to 15
other areas with equivalent sophistication.
Hundreds of these stories are percolating in this cauldron, often covered in CLCR’s Labor Research
Review .4   One result has been a dramatic change in the leadership of the AFL-CIO.  The new
leaders have brought “into the Building” some of the best thinkers from many sectors to address the
serious issues of our economy and society.  A huge reserve of resources and ideas within this
movement  will shape the character of the new paradigm of development.
From the Environmental Movement
Emerging from 1970s events like Earth Day, environmentalism has gained enormous influence,
reflected in desperate marketing efforts by traditional companies to be identified as “green.”  More
recently, an Environmental Justice current has united the concerns of African American, Latino, and
indigenous people with environmental issues.
The movement has always had an activist image.  Less visible but as important have been its
breakthroughs in thinking on issues of technology, process and product.   Leading environmental
thinkers such as Amory Lovins have the confidence to say that technological and systems answers
exist for all the environmental challenges we face.  These developments are picked up by other
leading thinkers and organizations in the movement.  The challenge is to build a majority consensus
for a new paradigm of development through the linking of economic and environmental
sustainability.
From Local Politics and Community Activism
The traditions of the old paradigm included an activist movement that hollered like hell for its piece
of the pie.  Just because it was loud, visible, and at times effective did not mean it was anything more
than a desire to be part of the line at the trough.  This is true in local politics and local community
organizing--and these currents are as visible today as they were in the past.
Of course, it is critically important to continue to fight for a fair distribution of wealth, and many of
these groups and political figures are a constructive and essential part of civil society.  Within this
context, many political and community organizations went beyond the limits of redistribution and
explored the relationships and responsibilities that will be required in a new paradigm of
development.
In the early 1980s, Mayor Harold Washington of Chicago advanced an agenda that built a grassroots
movement.  It became almost a spiritual period for those involved because of the dramatic changes
he embodied and suggested.
Some pathbreaking efforts in community organizing suggest new social relations of production that
would be the norm in a different approach to development.  The Dudley Street Initiative in Boston
organized residents in true community-based planning and successfully used the tool of eminent
domain to assemble land to realize their plans.  In a semi-rural community like Athens, Ohio, the
Appalachian Center for Economic Networks (ACE Net) has created a Food Kitchen that provides
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assistance and resources to some 40 micro-enterprises and small companies, helping them grow,
expand, increase employment, and build the community.  The Intervalley Project in the Northeast has
tied industrial retention, business development, health care, and housing together with citizen
participation. There are countless other examples of local leaders and organizations engaging in truly
pioneering work.
From International Experience
Early in the 1980s, those looking for new approaches to development began to find overseas
experiences that were very advanced and consistent with the values of a new paradigm of
development.  Looming large in influence is Mondragon, a network of worker-owned production
cooperatives in the Basque region of Spain.
Mondragon began modestly with the efforts of a visionary priest and a handful of technical workers
in the 1950s.  They created a small industrial cooperative that grew into a large network of
cooperatives.  The Mondragon cooperatives restructured in 1991 to form a single company, the
Mondragon Corporacion Cooperativa which, as of 1997, employed 30,634 workers, and uses
sophisticated technology, financial and management systems.  It remains profoundly linked to all
aspects of community in the surrounding region.  Each company is run on the principle of “one
worker, one vote” and is part of a web of creative democratic life with constant tensions and
adjustments. Compensation is calculated on a balanced ratio between the lowest-paid and highest-
paid.
Mondragon is even more compelling in its explicit link to the struggle of the oppressed Basque
people, who have used their common culture, language, history, and politics in an economic form
that now competes at the top of the Spanish economy and provides inspiration internationally.
Mondragon represents cooperative principles applied to large-scale industry, in complex and growing
communities, and a living commitment to democracy in the economy.
The Emilia-Romagna and Venezia regions of Northern Italy, known as centers for “flexible
manufacturing networks”, provide confidence and inspiration for those looking for new models.
Here a network of small and often cooperatively owned companies work in a constantly changing
consortia of companies to secure contracts that permit them to grow and create more companies,
more jobs, and more resources for their communities.  These companies are typically very small,
very high-tech, and very flexible--pooling their strengths, yet not losing their individual initiative.
They are also profoundly linked to the local socialist, communist, and labor-oriented Catholic
governments that nurture them in many ways, a fact conveniently ignored or avoided by conventional
analysts.
In both Mondragon and northern Italy, we found successful entrepreneurs who mastered management
of the opportunities within the domestic and international marketplace, yet deliberately maintained a
connection and tension with values that give primacy to people and their development.  Neither
region tolerates a “utopian” label in its candor in trying to manage the tensions and pressures of
operating in a different and often hostile world.  They continue to learn on the basis of their serious
mistakes.  In this honesty, as well as in their success, lie inspiration as well as specific sets of skills
for those who seek big changes.
In Québec, Canada a large network of producer, consumer, and investment cooperatives has been
created by community networks, unions, and entrepreneurs over the last several decades and
constitutes a significant force in rural and urban communities.  It is supported by a variety of
resources including large union-initiated funds such as the Solidarity Fund created by the Fédération
des travailleurs et des travailleuses du Québec (FTQ) and the Fondaction created by the
Confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN). In the last few years this breadth of capacity, vision,
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and experience has been gathered under the umbrella of the “social economy.”  It has gained political
recognition and resources from the government in Québec and from the business community leading
to commitments of $500 million to eradicate poverty from a province of 7 million people.  The social
economy movement has embraced the needs, aspirations, and capacity of all the segments of the
economy not included in the traditional private sector or government.  This includes the cooperative
network, not-for-profits, cultural organizations, social-service organizations, women’s and other
democratic organizations, the environmental movement, and others--constituting a force of huge
influence in society.
Within the socialist world, within the socialist and communist parties, and within revolutionary
parties such as the African National Congress, there is experience and analysis that contributes to this
search for a new paradigm.  It is certainly equal to that found in advanced capitalist countries,
companies, and parties.  In our travels we would hear about the doctrinaire character of the French
Communist Party, but then we would hear about the experience of the printers organized within that
party who anticipated the dramatic changes in printing technology and embraced that knowledge as
they created cooperative print shops.  We noted that the seemingly rigid British Labour Party
generated the Greater London Enterprise Board that experimented with community-driven
economics, with great sophistication and positive results.
Then there are the large, state-based communist parties like the Chinese Communist Party that have
embraced experiments with market forces and new forms of ownership and investments--insisting
that the socialist system is still in place and growing, not ceding the stage to the declared victory of
capitalism.
In South Africa, the most impressive political liberation of the last 30-40 years has demonstrated
stunning creativity, not only in political victory and transition, but in looking at the details of the
economy and production in their relation to mass movements.  In Europe, Australia and other
countries where social democratic parties have gained control of government, countless examples of
positive breakthroughs offer lessons about democracy, production, society, and economics that must
be included as influential resources for those looking for another way.
Gathered in a Common Vision
This expanding pool of experience and analysis is enough to offer a comprehensive alternative to the
current paradigm if we are willing to fight for it and do the work to sustain it.
We now come to the core of this new strategic perspective, which involves two useful concepts--The
Low Road and the High Road of development.  One holds to the negative features and social roles of
the present paradigm while the other seeks to learn new roles in a new paradigm.  It’s a comparison
between those who hold principally to their narrow self-interest despite the cost to society and its
productive capacity, and those who share a commitment to the alliance between labor, community,
and business in pursuit of the general development of society.
The Low Road seeks big short-term returns to a small section of the “private sector,” and its methods
are to lower wages, weaken organization, and promote destructive competition.  The High Road
seeks the highest and best use of our human and material resources and is made possible by values
that seek the broadest distribution of wealth and human development as an objective of the economy.
Obviously our strategy is to advance the High Road and block the Low Road.  This requires
recognition of three key components:
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First, many of the traditional stewards of our economy no longer have the incentives to maintain their
leadership in the development of our human and material assets in their search for wealth.  In fact,
their search for personal wealth now leads, in large part, to the destruction of our productive capacity
and our communities.  Therefore, they have lost the right to be making the key decisions regarding
our economy on both the macro and micro level.  They are pursuing the “Low Road” of development
with zeal.  These businesses on the low road must be blocked and prevented from continuing their
destructive practices.
Second, a fundamental change is required in the social relations of production and in those finally
responsible for the creation and control of wealth and the development of our productive capacity.
Labor and community must take full responsibility for driving the creation of wealth and
developing our productive capacity, rather than merely receiving a passive share of the wealth. They
must tap the skills, talents and resources of the section of the business community that has joined
them on the High Road of development, providing adequate and fair material incentives. They must
lead the way to sustainable development with zeal, creativity, and determination.  At the same time,
they must join with others in a broad coalition to block those on the Low Road.
Third, labor and community must demonstrate leadership at the micro as well as macro level of the
economy and society.  Government must be a key component of this strategy, and it must be linked
to a vast network of popular organizations and institutions skilled in bringing democracy and
participation to life among their constituents.
This strategy represents a third way of development contrasting sharply with both the
traditional command and free market approaches.   
Both macro and micro levels are essential arenas for education and training in the organization of a
transformative movement.  Democracy manifested solely in the state or in the election booth misses a
key opportunity.  Economic activity at the factory level must provide the definition for macro policy.
To do otherwise guarantees failure.
The High Road for development, in short, calls for:
# a vision of development in the context of the global economy;
# a fundamental change in economic policy to define leading roles for labor and community,
premised on labor and citizen participation in all aspects of the economy, politics, and society;
# development that is environmentally sustainable, which means that  companies make products
and use processes and technology that  are good for the health of workers, consumers, and
surrounding communities; and that they restore, rather than damage, the environment;
# development that is economically sustainable, creating jobs and  livelihood that allow and
encourage true human development.  We want good jobs that can support a family and allow
time for leisure, education, and social participation;
# development that is socially sustainable,  with an objective of overcoming historic divisions and
oppressions in society connected to race, gender, class, and national origin;
# a challenge to the limits of traditional redistributionist strategy for labor and community,
recognizing that redistribution can best be achieved through popular control and leadership;
# a strategic alliance between the labor movement and the political, democratic, environmental,
economic, new immigrant, and social organizations within the concept of “community”;
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# recognition that labor and community must accept the responsibility to lead in creating wealth
and developing productive capacity;
# recognition that the business sector includes friends and allies as well as low roaders, and that
we must leave behind a simplistic “anti-corporate” analysis;
# identifying market forces as well as mass movements as our tools and terrain for change;
# being entrepreneurial--seeking to be leaders in the market place as well as in the social and
political world-- and defining the essential connection between the two; and
# defining a clear role for government, including a responsibility to expand our civic structure
and life and to measure success by progress at the company and community level.
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Chapter 5:  Key Components of the High Road
Some key perspectives and tools are essential to our vision of development.
The Social Movement and the High Road  
This High and Low Road strategic framework emerges from the public side of the economy, the
social movement of those who have built and participated in labor and community organizations of
various kinds.  This American social movement has been relegated historically to being satisfied with
making demands and achieving objectives focused on the redistribution of wealth.  The premise was
that the creation and  control of wealth and key decisions of management, investment, and production
were reserved for the “private sector.”
For example, labor has almost exclusively demanded higher wages, more benefits, more jobs,
improved working conditions and recognition.  Labor was the squeaky wheel and our unions got the
grease for their members, and grew in strength.  These demands could be achieved, at least in part,
because of the expanding economy.  The labor-management social contract was based on the
assumption that wages and benefits would increase.
A requirement of this concord was that labor keep its nose out of management business.  As General
Motors once told the United Auto Workers, "Why don't you get down to your size and get down to
the type of job you’re supposed  to be doing as a trade union leader?  It's none of your damn business
what GM does about prices."5  All wings of the American labor movement generally accepted this
idea, confining their squeaks to the issue of "more or less."  The right wing  was passive and accepted
small progressive steps in wages and benefits.  The left wing screamed and led strikes for more
wages and benefits.  Both accepted and, in fact, preferred that management would make decisions on
production and marketing.  In the meantime, powerful sections of the business community became
focused on  control of production and maximizing short-term profits rather than on efficiency of
production and the development of society.
In the 1970s and 1980s, unlike the 1960s, demands for income redistribution began to lose their
power.  Workers, community residents, and the general public were saturated with information about
job losses, plant closings, globalization, the emergence of seemingly powerful competitors like
Japan, new technology, the rumored “end of work,” and leaner and meaner production.  This
provided a fertile environment for a Low Road corporate offensive against labor.  The failure of the
Air Traffic Controllers union (PATCO) strike and growing anti-union sentiment--not only among
corporations but among the public--discouraged assertive action for jobs, wages, and benefits.
Everyone became fearful of punishment for being too assertive, of being on the wrong end of the
stick if their profiles were too high, or of following leaders whose demands would make the them
vulnerable rather than stronger.
The corporate attacks on unionism in the late 1970s and early 1980s resulted in greater silence, rather
than a protest movement; in the weakening of popular organizations at the workplace and in the
community; and in the growth of narrow self-interest.  In contract negotiations, management at
company after company would demand give-backs in wages and benefits as well as other
concessions, and would get them quickly, for workers feared losing their jobs and losing them
permanently.  Aggressive managers made demands in order to provoke a strike, confident that
strikebreakers drawn from the mass of unemployed workers would now cross a picket line.
Communities that had been the site of armed rebellions and protest actions under the economic and
social conditions of the 1960s remained silent as poverty rates soared, services were cut, and
discrimination expanded in new forms.
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In this context, popular support went only to campaigns and organizing efforts that advanced
redistribution of wealth combined with a sophisticated view of practical ways to run the company or
a segment of the local economy. Many of the pioneering groups in the Federation for Industrial
Retention and Renewal formed out of a successful local, mass campaign around a particular plant
closing and suggestions of new ways of running the economy.  These campaigns compared well to
traditional redistributionist campaigns in the same communities.
The new conditions, in short, require that a social movement maintain its demands for a better and
more fair distribution of wealth, but also that it go beyond redistribution to lead in the creation of
wealth--seeking control and the right and capacity to manage the economy at every level.
Making the shift from a movement rooted in seeking redistribution of wealth to a movement that
leads in the creation of wealth is not easy.  It requires a profound reorganization guided by research
and analysis and tempered through direct participation in all aspects of production, marketing, and
management, as well as critical reflection.  Such a social movement must take advantage of every
opportunity to learn through participation and action to develop the capacity to succeed.  It must be
informed by a sophisticated and independent analysis that reflects its values in making decisions
within the context of the firm and economy.  It must consciously train its established and emerging
leaders in the requirements and possibilities of this work.  It must create models that demonstrate the
power and practicality of these new approaches. The social movement must develop its own financial
capacity and have the talent and skills required to acquire and operate companies as well as access to
capital in all its forms.
Equally, the social movement must hone and use its traditional skills of militant mass action,
organizing, and political action, not only to wield “non-market” power effectively, but also to
increase the involvement and identity of more and more people and popular organizations.  All
effective development strategies combine money, technical skill and politics.  The required skill is to
know how to manage the tensions that result.
Within this conceptual framework, we must recognize that sections of the business community share
the fundamental objectives of our High Road.  And a broader segment of the business community has
at least a material interest in the success of building the economy, no matter what strategic alliance
guides development.  Business people bring indispensable skills and resources to the process, and
must be attracted and recruited to our efforts.  In return for their work, they must be rewarded with
fair compensation and return on investment, with partnerships that enhance the performance of their
companies, and inclusion in all aspects of our community.
The Role of the Market
Markets, market pressure, and the marketplace are part of all economies and societies at every stage
of development.  Market forces are objective features of our current system, past systems, and future
systems.  How they operate varies with each society’s priorities and capacities.   Market influence
has both positive and negative impacts. How the balance is managed depends on the values,
priorities, and capacities of the society and its leaders. This is the source of values in the market.
One of the paralyzing aspects of today’s discussion on systems and development is the notion offered
by some sections of both the left and the right that use of markets require an embrace of capitalism,
and that to use the strengths of the market is to embrace “free market ideology.”  Whatever system
one embraces has to do with the values and priorities of that system, not whether or not it uses
markets.
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Our strategy for development accepts and masters the positive aspects of the market as a foundation
for exposing the limits of the market. Market forces are driven by the laws of supply and demand
and, if used effectively, can contribute to greater efficiency, lower cost, and high quality.  Market
forces can also lead to inefficiency, high costs, low quality, and human degradation and suffering.
We accept the requirement of businesses and agencies to be efficient,  productive, and profitable as a
reflection of good management within the restraints of available financial resources, technology, and
labor talent and capacity.  We recognize entrepreneurial actions and skill as leadership within the
economic realm and we cultivate and encourage entrepreneurial talent that accepts our broader
values.  The critical questions are these: What values and priorities are driving decisions within the
limits of the market?  How do we use the surplus value generated in the market?  How creative and
effectively do we use non-market capacities to accommodate  the market’s limits?
In addition to “market forces,” the “Market Place” puts the discussion in a particular social context
and within pressures and standards of the time.  The character of the market place  changes
continually, depending upon who’s bringing what to the market and under what terms.  The
marketplace of a Native American village is similar to and distinct from Wall Street.  Both are arenas
of exchange, supply, demand, and the negotiation of terms.  Their social, political, and cultural
contexts are dramatically different.
Our new strategic framework combines use of traditional market forces with skillful use of resources
typically not seen as part of the market: taxation, regulation, and powers such as eminent domain.  It
includes social action like organized purchases or boycotts of products, negotiated contracts and
strikes.  This spectrum of tools allows us to achieve the economic and social objectives of sustainable
development.
For many in community development or at one margin or another of the business community, all
conflict or use of force is avoided or feared.  Within the business community, force and conflict are
continually in use.  Often the most successful are the most adept at managing it--that’s why there are
so many corporate lawyers.  Businesses come and go and are pushed and shoved--sometimes over
the brink.  Competition can be ruthless.
This kind of conflict usually leads to a negotiated peace.  Our problem with this is not the conflict
itself, but the values and priorities that guide it.  We frequently see people, assets and resources that
are indispensable to the development of our society being wasted in the internal corporate wars.
Our new social movement should not leave its conflict management skills at the door when it enters
the market.  It should simply get better at using them.  Our values should use conflict and force, yes,
in order to discourage or block the Low Road.
Our physical position in production and in the community gives us a strategic advantage in blocking
development that we do not want and in promoting development that is ours.  The non-traditional
tools that our social movement can wield give us an enormous advantage in competing with the
regulars.  We can not only save jobs, companies, communities, and generate funds and all the other
by-products of conventional development; we can also train and prepare labor and community for
their new leadership role in the economy.
Our strategic vision requires that when market activity supports the High Road and is consistent with
our values, we “follow the market,” maybe tinkering or adjusting the activity as necessary.  When
market activity is leaning toward the Low Road, we either challenge those who are guiding it and
move to “lead the market” ourselves, or we lead in the pursuit of non-market solutions bringing in
the power of government or the organizational power of society.  Our effectiveness in the market
will, in the long run, be measured by the percentage of production that is geared toward human need
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and the decline of poverty and inequality.
Many examples in the field of employee ownership illustrate effective use of the market and
traditional market skills and demonstrate the “competitive advantage” that labor has in certain market
settings.  Recognition and skillful use of those advantages permits labor to block a Low Road
strategy and implement a High Road strategy guided by our own management values .
Scully Jones
In Chicago in 1983, Bendix Corporation (owned by Allied) was planning to sell one of its production
facilities--Scully Jones, a machine tool-holder manufacturing company-- as one step in a corporate
consolidation plan.   Fifty production workers represented by the United Electrical Workers Union
(UE) and ten salaried workers were at risk of  losing their jobs.  When the plans were announced, a
company engineer named Cy Wax, among others, knew that the firm had value and could have a
future under the right management strategy.
Workers and managers at the facility, posed, debated and answered the question, “Why don’t we buy
it?” The recollection still brings tears to Cy’s eyes.  With very little experience, with a dangerous lack
of information, with a dash of audacity, and with two cups of determination, the production and local
management employees developed a plan, borrowed money, created an employee owner structure
rooted in democratic principles as well as shareholder return, and bought the company.
Despite the objections and absence of assistance from UE’s national leadership, which was
ideologically opposed to worker ownership, the transition happened.  The company has sustained and
expanded the jobs at the company despite very difficult market conditions.  Democratic life
permeates the structure, where the CEO--Cy Wax--faces election every year.  Union members still
pay their dues to the UE and maintain union life.  And the rest of us in the city have a good example
of labor and management on the High Road together--saving jobs and a corporation despite the plans
of Bendix to disinvest.  In the Chicago market place, something different happened because new
entrepreneurs with a different vision and different values intervened.
Morse Cutting Tool
In the early 1980s, another UE local guided by a different strategic perspective demonstrated the
power of traditional organizing tools when creatively applied in a business or market setting.6  This
did not involve an employee buyout.
UE Local 277 represented the workers at Morse Cutting Tool, an anchor company in the coastal town
of New Bedford, MA that made twist drills to be held by the tool holders made at Scully Jones.  In
1968, Morse Cutting Tool was purchased by Gulf + Western (G+W).  In 1981, a dramatic shift in
management policy signaled impending demands for wage and benefit concessions and threats that
the firm might shut down. Local UE staff member Ron Carver7 knew that to wait to respond during
the typical contract cycle would almost guarantee the local’s defeat in negotiations and could lead to
devastating job  loss for the community.  Ron turned to the Industrial Cooperative Association (ICA)
in Somerville, MA, a then-new consulting firm inspired by the Mondragon model to help workers
build cooperatives.
ICA did a study of G+W’s management of Morse Cutting Tool that documented its business strategy
of "milking the cash cow"--draining the company of cash for use in other acquisitions.  They showed
in detail how this viable, profitable company that employed hundreds of workers was being destroyed
by G+W's narrow corporate approach.   G+W was reinvesting about 2% of gross sales into capital
improvements in an industry that required at least 8% annual reinvestment. It was buying a car and
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never changing the oil.
The consequence was obvious.  The union documented what the impact of the closing would be on
the small town.  It went door-to-door and organized a broad coalition of local organizations.  Armed
with community support and a detailed analysis of G+W’s wrecking methods, the union went to
Mayor Brian Lawler and persuaded him to use the state's power of eminent domain to prevent G+W
from closing Morse Cutting Tool.
The mayor told the company, "Either invest in Morse Cutting Tool, or sell it to someone who will, or I
will take it away from you with my powers of eminent domain." The press howled that this stand
would wreck the business climate of New Bedford as well as the company.  But it didn’t.  G+W
reversed its plans and sold the company to a local investor who developed an effective partnership
with the union.
The market place in New Bedford produced some new entrepreneurs who changed its terms.  Labor
with community support refused to let one company destroy their local economic assets and
intervened with ordinary politics forcing the sale of the company to another corporation that would
continue to develop the local asset.
Sharpsville Quality Products
In 1990, members of Steelworker Local at Sharpsville Quality Products in the Pittsburgh area
narrowly supported their local president in a controversial decision to agree to a company
“participation in management” proposal.  Union members used the program to learn more about the
company and the industry.  When faced with a three-day notice of management’s plan to shut the
plant down, the workers occupied the company for 42 days with a sit-down strike.
From their position of power and by gaining community support, they negotiated a purchase of the
company with the assistance of Locker Associates, a consulting and investment firm that has a long
history of defining labor’s power in the market context,8and the Steel Valley Authority, a regional
industrial retention initiative.9  The buyout was supported by local churches and community
organizations who created the A New Beginning Fund and loaned the workers $250,000.  The
company remains open under employee ownership.  The market place in Pittsburgh adjusted to the
dramatic entry of these new union/worker entrepreneurs with strong community support.
Participation and Democracy
Our strategy is premised on growing participation, consultation, and democratic control of the
economy as something that makes economic and social sense.  Our economics requires the
organization of mass movements and the creation of effective mass organizations such as unions,
community-based organizations, and political structures.  Through these movements people gain
essential knowledge of, and consciousness about, their ties to one another and their collective
strength.  It is in fact the one feature which gives our approach to development its competitive
advantage.  We can marshal the knowledge, enthusiasm, militancy, and creativity of a profoundly
broader network of people in recognizing, developing, and protecting our economy.
Of course, expanding democracy and worker participation during the non-stop battle to maintain a
positive cash flow, or while in difficult negotiation, is like expanding democracy during wartime.  It
is often difficult and complex, particularly when the combination of roles that we suggest is
relatively new.  We recognize that the resolution of the inevitable conflicts is where the real training,
education, and capacity-building takes place.  These are of course essential for the kind of paradigm
shift we suggest.  So we encourage organized participation at all levels of the economy and society,
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recognizing that this is a precondition for human development.
Eastern Airlines
In 1983, the Chairman of the Board at Eastern Airlines, Frank Borman, saw an opportunity in the
climate that surrounded labor negotiations.  In preliminary talks with Charlie Bryan, President of
District 100 of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), Borman
asked for major wage and benefit concessions.10  Rather than view this as an issue of redistribution
and whether or not his members were worth more or less in the marketplace, Bryan responded to the
demand as if it were a request by Borman for a loan or investment in the company. The Machinists
sought the assistance of Randy Barber, a pioneer in the development of capital strategies for labor.
As any banker or investor would, Bryan then entertained Borman’s proposal on the condition that the
union have access to the full financial records of the company for an independent analysis of how the
company should be operated in the “competitive” climate.
Following a thorough review, the union granted Eastern some concessions in exchange for positions
on the Board of Directors, stock ownership, unlimited access to all company financial information, a
right to review the company business plan, and new labor-initiated and controlled productivity plans.
Through a highly participatory process, union leadership united the rank and file around its plan and
prevailed.  The union’s approved plan  “saved the company $53 million on an annualized basis.  Many
of these savings recur year after year, meaning that from January 1984 to January 1986 the union
provided a total of $137 million in cost savings through...contracting in...repair versus
replace...manufacture versus purchase...rebid supplier contracts...and labor force reductions through
attrition and cuts in planned new hiring.”11
Despite the promise of these innovations, Frank Borman competed to become “Low Road CEO of the
decade.”  As Charlie Bryan said, the “idea we had of developing complete trust between labor and
management with a culture of co-determination ended with total betrayal by corporate power brokers
in the night of February 23, 1986.”  That night the Board of Directors, over the objections of
employee representatives, sold Eastern Airlines to Texas Air Corporation, run by Frank Lorenzo, the
airline industry’s lead union-buster.12
In the same way that labor began to master the use of Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs),
emerging labor leaders developed sophisticated ways to implement “Participation in Management”
systems that both improved the performance of the company through ideas generated by the
workforce and protected the jobs and rights of the workers who had the ideas.  Experimentation and
its results in this arena are indispensable, not only in building strong companies but in promoting
democratic participation in all aspects of organizational life.13 
The Development Model of Organizing
The traditional development paradigm has often rewarded organizers, and even their most militant
actions.  Management had grease to give and a willingness to give it.  Most battles for a bigger share
of the pie were short-lived, particularly after World War II.  Of course, factors of race and gender
brought into play much deeper contradictions in society and added complexity, length, and often
defeat to campaigns.  And even simple campaigns for redistribution of wealth were often very
difficult, dangerous, complex and protracted, and sometimes resulted in bitter loss.  But generally
speaking, most campaigns could generate results in a relatively short period of time.
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Campaign duration was proportional to the breadth of the base, militancy or the threat of militancy,
effective public relations, and creativity of the organizers.  In this context, community organizing
traditions such as that of Saul Alinsky flowered and gained influence.  In labor, huge unions were
built in explosive fashion within the context of a relatively narrow program and range of activities.
In the 1960s, a leaflet or two plus a picket line or a sit-in could attract thousands.
In the last 15-20 years, the rules for organizing have changed.  What worked within the old social
contract can no longer work predictably in today’s environment.  In reaction to the passivity and
bureaucracy of union leadership in the 1960s and 1970s, emerging leaders developed the “organizing
model” of union leadership to oppose the “service model.”  But even this shift to a more activist
approach doesn’t always prove to be enough.
We promote the Development Model of Organizing14 that builds individuals, organizations, and
communities in seeking a profound transformation of society.  This model focuses on building a
qualitative foundation for quantitative growth.  Traditional organizing that focuses on
redistributionist demands and mobilizes people on the lowest common denominator of their concerns
barely or rarely goes above that in raising their consciousness about the character of society or in
giving them strategic vision.  The activist or militant organizers are more aggressive and strident, but
they have essentially the same reductionist approach as those who mobilize people to embrace one
aspect or another of the status quo.  The Saul Alinsky organizing tradition offers a full array of these
styles that vary in form but not in substance.  At this early stage in our new movement, emphasis
must be placed on selecting leaders carefully, providing patient training and education on the full
features of a new strategic vision, and developing the skills needed to build strong and vibrant
participatory organizations at all levels.
From our experience, consulting firms, unions, community coalitions, national coalitions, or business
organizations that embrace this new strategy of development always require an organizational
transformation of some kind.  In the last 10 years, we have seen the collapse of a number of
organizations that thrived in earlier periods, and a number of dynamic organizational leaders have
crashed and burned.  Like organizing strategies, organizational structure and culture must be based
on what works in the context of different programmatic objectives.
Community groups and unions were organized around the assumption that campaigns would
typically be relatively straightforward and short.  Now they can last for years and require
sophistication in moving from one complex stage to the next complex stage.  Oppositional skills
were an essential element of success in the 1960s and were frequently enough to win the contract or
victory. Today, the same organization with the same opponent needs to advance an alternative and
achievable business strategy as the context for its demands to maintain or improve wages and
benefits.
Success requires effective approaches to finance and management.  Gaining community support
requires reframing the fight from a labor-management battle or a company/community battle so as to
define it as a coalition of workers and their broader community against a narrow corporate approach
and in support of a more effective business strategy.  Staff and organizers need different qualities,
different training, and a different mindset from the old days, if they are to succeed.  The conversion is
often difficult.  Organizational change must be anticipated and addressed with candor and skill.  The
same applies to consulting and research companies that work in this field.  Technical talent must be
matched with political judgment and skill.
As one such company, CLCR itself almost collapsed under the pressures tied to understanding and
applying our own new strategic approach.  We too required and sought outside management
assistance, and this led to a complete restructuring in our approach to our own finances, management,
and quality control.
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Critical and Dialectical Thinking  
I believe that we are at the beginning of a relatively long transition period of 30 or 40 years that will
result in the kind of economy and society envisioned in this paper.  The transition will be
complicated and difficult and requires careful, patient, and honest analysis as leaders seek to
understand and transform events. As philosophers teach us, all development springs from the struggle
among contradictory aspects of a thing.  Negative and positive qualities are in constant
transformation.  We need to understand  dialectics recognizing that in many cases, our work will be
characterized by weakness--say 80% weak and 20% strong.  We need to be skilled in recognizing
that 20% and building on it to address the weaknesses in a protracted process that will lead to work
that is 80% strong and 20% weak, or better.
It’s frequently very difficult to weigh the positive and negative qualities of organizations, strategies,
leaders, or opponents and to correctly understand how they are changing and what the most effective
policy of the moment may be.  At an early stage, not much convincing data is ever available.  This
demands a commitment to critical thinking and digging beneath the surface.  It requires the
willingness to identify strengths and weaknesses candidly in our work, knowing that “truth is beauty”
even if it’s painful and means more work.  Active and spirited debate among contending views has to
be nurtured.  Writing analytical descriptions of current events and in-depth evaluations of theory has
to be a requirement of leaders and organizers.  To succeed at this requires the skills of using
differences between people and organizations as a springboard for building organizations and
relationships rather than for tearing them apart.
One of the classic features of old thinking is seen in those who resist, refuse, and discourage this
critical process.  We see it in community and development organizations that avoid the complex and
controversial, fearful that their reputation will suffer if they acknowledge or confront a weakness.
We see and welcome dynamic experimentation by the new AFL-CIO, but we worry at the apparent
lack of critical reflection.  In organizer circles, a deeply entrenched anti-intellectualism seizes on the
easy weaknesses of hollow theoreticians as excuses for avoiding their own analytical responsibilities.
There are strong anti-leadership traditions that view dissenting opinion argument as inherently
negative or arrogant.  This undermines the absolute responsibility of leaders to lead--which by
definition requires espousing a minority view initially, and then sending it into competition with
opposing or differing views.
We must recognize the positive and negative aspects of competition.  As we do in the market, we
master the positive ideas to expose and counter the negative ones.  Competition is an essential quality
of economic and democratic life and can be used in ways that enhance and strengthen democracy and
productive capacity either within or among firms and communities.  The same tension applies to the
positive and negative aspects of cooperation.  Cooperation in one setting is absolutely appropriate
and constructive.  In another setting, such as when someone has a diametrically opposed view,
cooperation becomes corrosive.
We now must leave behind the luxury of believing that all needs can be met.  We need to
acknowledge and accept the limits imposed by uneven development of resources, knowledge, and
capacity.  No perfect distribution system exists, nor does complete capacity.  Hard and difficult
decisions of allocation must be made and they can’t satisfy all concerns.  The ability to make these
decisions fairly at the firm and community level qualifies and trains us to make similar decisions in a
national or international framework, and that is a prerequisite for overcoming the limits imposed on
us.
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Part of an International Strategy  
Every aspect of our economy and society is now influenced by global pressures.  Our development
strategy must be consistent with and contribute to a vision of international sustainable development.
We have a continuing obligation to speak to the immediate needs of our communities, but their
satisfaction cannot be based on an exploitative relationship with any other segment of the wider
international community, like the exploitative relationships that made our expanding economy
possible through the early and mid-20th Century.  In fact, our development strategy must be the
opposite--aggressively linking our capacities to those in other countries, seeking to transfer wealth
and technology to promote economic stability and development internationally.
Rather than simply opposing international agreements on trade and investment, a stance that can
mask protectionist and nativist priorities, we should work to develop international agreements on
trade and investment that reflect our values and commitment to mutual development.  It is true that
80% of our production goes to domestic markets, but that is no reason to avoid examining and
developing the international links in our strategy.  As we define the specific features of our
development model in its global and international context, we are forced to address the specific
challenges of competition, uneven development and stability that are present in these relationships.
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Chapter 6:  Labor and the High Road
At the heart of this strategic perspective is recognition of the powerful and leading role of labor in
development.  “Labor” is not a code word for union.  Labor is organized and unorganized and we
must work with both sectors.  Labor refers to people who work for others-- in production, service,
and lower levels of management and supervision. Labor is key because it is “the back that turns the
wheel” or “the brain that makes the judgment” in production.  By definition, it has the greatest access
to important information, it will determine the level of productivity and efficiency, it can block or
encourage the growth of the firm, and it is part of the broader community.  Its power in the company
must be recognized and encouraged by our policy initiatives.
New forms of labor participation in the firm and in the economy are a key element of our new
paradigm of community economic development.  The new economy requires a high level of
participation, consultation, and involvement in all aspects of decisionmaking by all the stakeholders.
Transforming the image of labor from that of just another commodity or a cost in production to that
of a full partner is one of our key objectives in extending and expanding democracy and participation
in our society.  This makes business and social sense.
Our successful work with labor is our key competitive advantage in promoting genuine community
development on the High Road.   Our understanding, commitment, and capacity to bring labor
forward as a strategic leader in the health and development of the firm, despite the obstacles, is the
most important advantage we have in retaining the assets of our economy and promoting
development that is economically, socially, and environmentally sustainable.
The Key Element in Productivity and Innovation  
Labor--organized and unorganized--is in the key strategic position to determine the success or failure
of a company.  Labor makes key daily judgments in production and it is labor’s morale and energy
that encourages or blocks smooth operations in the firm.   Its full engagement in the company can
lead to:
# new ideas on production and efficiency and increased productivity;
# equity in the company that can improve the firm’s balance sheet;
# political support for the firm in the community.
Labor is also a key source of information about the problems and opportunities inside the firm, and
information is crucial to developing effective policy.  Workers--organized or unorganized-- provide
the best source of non-public information about a company, by virtue of the fact that they:
# spend 40 to 80 hours a week there;
# observe or participate in all aspects of operations in every department;
# may have years of experience and perspective in evaluating the significance or insignificance of
any change in the company; and
# have a long-term vested interest in the success and continued operations of the company.
Workers often do not know the significance of the information around them, nor what to do with it,
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nor how it can and should be used.  Traditional relations of production have discouraged workers
from becoming aware of  the centrality of their role or the benefits that might come from analyzing
what is going on.  Neither unions, managers, local government, development corporations, or others
in the community reach out routinely to employees as a source of information, yet their information
is critical for a new strategy for development and needs to be part of the foundation of effective
action at the firm, community, or macro level of the economy.
To secure this information requires patient education and outreach.  Employees often feel
legitimately insecure in providing information, knowing that if they were found to be the source of
the information, it might cost them their job.  Those who seek the information must be careful to
preserve scrupulous confidentiality.
There are two benefits from gathering worker’s information: the information itself, and the resulting
change in the consciousness of the worker.  A person working for a wage becomes someone who is
responsible for what is going on in the company--and this transformation lies at the heart of our
strategy.
Unions and the High Road
A relatively small percentage of the workforce is organized--now 14.1%1-- and only a few of the
smaller companies that dominate a local economy are organized.  This is a real weakness in our
economy.  Strong and effective unions in companies large and small are central to the High Road of
development.  Why?  Unions represent the effort of workers to define the labor contract collectively,
not only in their negotiations with management, but also in the internal debate on what constitutes a
reasonable contract.  Unions provide contact among the workers in a company with workers in other
companies, and relations with other sectors of society.  This broad framework  promotes education,
accountability, solidarity, and political action.
Unions protect the contract rights of the individual in conflicts with management as well as with
other workers.  In employee-owned companies, unions are an essential protection of minority rights
in conflict with majority will.  Good managers value good unions.  Unions provide organizational
structure in production.  They make it possible to have structured agreements among representatives
which makes negotiations more efficient and typically improves the content. Strong CEOs want
strong managers, who inevitably make mistakes if they are doing their jobs.  With unions, employees
have protection from those errors.  This system can strengthen everyone in their part of a company’s
necessary division of labor.   Unions are also a source of information for the company about what is
going on in other parts of the sector.
As in all human undertakings, labor organizations and their leaders range from the excellent and
competent to incompetent and corrupt.  Within labor there are “High Road” and “Low Road” unions
shaped by history, leadership, and composition.  As with local management, each situation requires
concrete analysis to determine action and policy.  But the existence of a union is overall, a positive
factor in our approach to community development and company development, because it reflects
organization and leadership within the firm.  This can facilitate the flow of information and make
access to it easier.  Additionally, the parent union can be a source of broader information about the
company and other firms in its sector, and it can provide financial and other resources to meet the
needs of the company and the workers.  Union organization, however, can block access to
information too as can management, so that an informed policy on the particular local, its larger
union and the local labor council are also essential.
Critical and very positive changes are taking place in organized labor.  For decades, labor leadership
defended the private sector’s right to be the steward of the economy.  Here is George Meany,
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president of the AFL-CIO in 1955.
Where management decisions affect a worker directly, a union will intervene... (But) those matters
that do not touch a worker directly, a union cannot and will not challenge.  These may include
investment policy, a decision to make a new product, a desire to erect a new plant so as to be closer to
expanding markets, etc...
After decades of this passivity, organized labor is coming alive at every level, re-examining its
various roles with a critical and creative eye.  Leaders are now wide open to new options that benefit
their members and allies, and they now represent a potentially powerful array of resources and
influence.  They value High Road strategic thinking  and concerns about industrial retention and
development work.  Some emerging leaders recognize that unions will build their  organization and
representation only if labor takes a lead role in all aspects of the firm and the economy.  They point
out that failure to advance the broader issues will ultimately lead to failures in organizing drives.  We
activists who carefully preserve and develop our role with organized labor will give our projects
enormous competitive advantage in years to come, and we who do not will fail no matter how well
intended-intentioned we are.
Labor and “Capital Strategies”
“Capital Strategies” is the term that has come to describe labor’s entry into issues and concerns
historically reserved for the private sector in the traditional economic paradigm.  The most concise
and complete definition is offered by Randy Barber,
A capital strategy is an integrated approach to trying to affect all aspects of the structure, finance, and
operations of both single employers and entire industries.2
These strategies are becoming more complex and effective as labor gains experience. Their use
involves research, technical work, organizing, finance, politics, legal tactics, and pure power.  They
usually require finding individuals within the firm or industry who share our objectives--at least in
part.  They require a dramatic shift in the attitude of leaders who want to use them.  Capital strategies
acknowledge the strengths of the marketplace and require mastery of the skills necessary to use those
strengths for labor's advantage.
Capital strategies typically begin at the firm level but should not end there, for inherent weaknesses
can doom  a strategy that remains focused on one firm.  Labor needs strategies that eventually link
firms together and that seek broader political change on state and national levels.  They need to be
part of the fight for national policies that promote and support our efforts on the local level.
The Variety of Tactics
Capital strategies have many different tactical components.  Many were developed by creative union
leaders over the last 20 years in response to shifts in the economy.  The list  is getting longer as labor
gets more sophisticated, but it now includes:
1.  Corporate or comprehensive campaigns to influence the outcome of corporate takeover maneuvers
or to prevent a corporate strategy that attacks labor's interests;
2. Community and government involvement in efforts to maintain, modernize, or expand corporate
facilities through coercion, as with the eminent domain strategy used at Morse Cutting Tool, or by
persuasion as with the use of public subsidies to offset extraordinary costs;
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3.  Exchange of government resources for the company, such as training dollars for pro-labor
objectives;
4.  Investment pools that favor workers and companies that are pro-labor, such as the Crocus Fund in
Manitoba.  The Crocus Fund was created by the Manitoba Federation of Labor in 1993, capitalized by
provincial monies, pension fund investments, as well as the investment of almost 16,000 citizens of
Manitoba who receive a tax credit in return.  The Crocus Fund has accumulated more than $90 million
and is used to retain Manitoba companies and promote employee and local ownership.  It has been
very successful and is growing rapidly.  It is similar to the Quebec Solidarity Fund and other funds
emerging in Canada that now represent $4 billion out of a total of $7 billion of Canadian venture
capital, and more importantly, the participation of 500,000 individual investors.
5.  Negotiated production agreements that cover issues of product, process, finance, and marketing,
intervening in topics that are the traditional realm of management.
6.  Participation in management as a labor strategy.
7.  Partial or total purchase of the company along the lines of the United Airlines buyout;
8.  Demands for  access to corporate information;
9.  Established rights of first refusal as part of a labor contract in the event the company becomes
available for sale;
10.  Use of union pension funds for the public interest:  withdrawing them from investment in
companies that pursue Low Road strategies or investing them in companies with the High Road
approach.  For example, Local 675 of the International Union of Operating engineers in Ft.
Lauderdale Florida developed an aggressive strategy for its pension fund.  Workers discovered that
pension trustees had invested in companies engaged in anti-union activities, including construction of
the National-Right-To-Work Committee headquarters in Virginia.  The union took control and
withdrew its money from that investment, moving it to make affordable mortgages available to their
members.  The union then financed the development of an office park with 30 buildings constructed
with union labor.  These and other projects helped Local 675 leverage over $400 million of
construction work for local building trades members3.
Several components are essential to successful use of these strategies.
1.  Good Information: Accurate and timely information is a key requirement for successful capital
strategies.  Sophisticated training and research programs for unions, community organizations, and
local government can help secure and analyze this type of information systematically.4
2.  Research and Analysis:  At the heart of practically any effective capital strategy is an independent
analysis reflecting labor’s interests and values.  It covers the plant, the company, the sector,
national/international factors, and available options.
3.  Technical Skills and Capacity: Labor must have the capacity to perform the tasks that are needed
to buy, run, and improve a company so that it is driven by labor values.
4.  Finance:  Access to money is needed for purchase, working capital, and all the other components
of capital strategies.
5.  Education and training of the membership:   This is fundamental and must start at the
beginning.
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6.  Help: The AFL-CIO and some international unions are developing sophisticated internal
capacity to help with all the components of capital strategies.  Probably 20 different consulting firms
also share labor's interests and specialize in aspects of this work.
A number of dangers and problems often emerge in the use of  Capital Strategies.
1.  Falling prey to management’s anti-labor strategies:   Some of these ideas are often
initiated by management--particularly plans for ESOPs and participation programs--and are also
intentionally or unintentionally anti-worker and anti-union.  After investigating the situation, a union
may want to proceed with the program, but should use it as an organizing tool taking advantage of the
space and any ignorance by management to turn the tables.
2.  Turning over leadership and initiative to the technicians.  While acknowledging expertise,
labor leaders must be informed and in control of the important decisions involved in capital strategies.
They must not abdicate the responsibility of grasping the significance of technical issues and making
the right judgments.  The technician or consultant's job is to develop the capacity of the union or
group of workers to lead by transferring as much skill as possible, not to create an unnecessary
dependency.
3.  Failing to organize, educate, and involve the members from the very beginning.  Every
aspect of our strategy requires the training and education of leaders and participants.  But often, the
pressure of “doing the deal” takes over and education is forgotten.  Complex and pressing problems of
finance, legality,  management, or some other critical technical component demand the time and
resources of leaders.  This is normal.  Leaders seeking to apply this strategic framework, however
must give training and education of new leaders and the rank and file a priority level equal to that of
hiring a good attorney or investment banker.
4. Being cynical and superficial:  Passion can create possibilities.  These campaigns typically
require strong charismatic leaders who help people rise to the challenges of the difficult.  Those skills
need to be cultivated and nurtured in the mix of talents essential for these projects.  On the other hand,
passion and charisma are only good if they set the stage for the hard and persistent work required if
the benefits of capital strategies are to be realized.  These projects demand persistence and
determination.
5.  Seeing only the immediate battle as important: Achieving the immediate objective of
saving the company and jobs is important but it is only the first step of many.   The criteria for judging
success have to consider the project’s contribution to strengthening the broader effort to build the
movement.
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Chapter 7: Worker Ownership
Despite long and successful European and Canadian traditions, American experiments in worker
ownership had been on the fringes of the economy until the late 1970s.  With a few notable
exceptions, employee-owned businesses fell within the "sandals and candles" category--small craft
cooperatives.  The labor movement had no compelling reason to understand the dynamics, dangers,
or possibilities of worker ownership.
Since then, however, interest in employee ownership has grown dramatically, along with an increase
in the number of employee-owned companies.  The potential for growth in the field is enormous.
More important is the potential for employee owners in concert and collaborating with other socially-
minded entrepreneurs to provide leadership and vision for the management of the entire economy as
it stumbles and decays under its more parochial owners and managers. Linked to this potential is the
opportunity to extend the growing demand for greater democracy into the economy.
This is the time for us to "think big."  To do so requires a critical evaluation of the last decade and a
careful and candid dissection of what was positive and negative as a foundation for new visions and
programs.  Worker ownership needs to be examined as more than a clever way for motivated
managers, workers, and consultants to establish a niche in a system filled with cracks.  It has to be
seen for its power to create new leadership in driving the creation of wealth.
A Traditional Corporate Tool
With the recent tremendous changes in the international and national economy, employee ownership
has become an option that labor cannot afford to ignore.
Passage of Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) legislation in 1974 allowed both pro-labor and
anti-labor strategies to become masked in the concepts of employee ownership.  Local unions and
groups of employees saw it as an alternative to closing a company after a change in corporate
strategy or mismanagement.  The press was filled with stories about ESOPs:  Rath Packing, South
Bend Lathe, and other local examples.  Employee ownership quickly became a very complicated
issue.  In this setting, increasing numbers of labor leaders and activists who were committed to
building the labor movement began to look critically at this concept.  They knew that to be
uninformed increased the chance of either becoming a victim of employee ownership or being denied
a possible labor weapon, and it was a time when labor’s traditional box of tactical tools  needed some
new equipment.  From the beginning, union skepticism or hostility was high, for  obvious reasons--
most early efforts at employee ownership often were contrary to labor's interests.
Under the populist-sounding legislation that gave rise to ESOPs, corporations and financial
institutions secured significant tax breaks, were able to refinance their companies and fend off
takeovers, and secured other benefits that could stabilize and strengthen them.  But they weren’t
required to do anything, despite the rhetoric surrounding the law, to advance labor's interests in
exchange.  In the most cynical situations, ESOPs were used as a means to secure labor concessions
and to isolate and weaken the union.
The corporate character of many ESOPs is graphically demonstrated by the number of them that
represent majority ownership by the employees, that permit real voting power with ownership shares,
or that are organized on a democratic basis where employees have real influence in management.
According to Jeff Gates, an architect of the ESOP, only “about a dozen publicly traded companies
are majority employee-owned, while 125 listed companies have at least 20% employee ownership.
A majority of listed ESOP firms (62%) have less than 10% employee ownership.”5
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In recent years, there have been many conferences around the country on ESOPs, and my experience
at one several years ago was typical.  Among more than a hundred people, only one other person had
any ties with labor.  The attendees were attorneys, bankers, accountants, managers, and CEOs.  One
company owner recounted how relieved he was when he found out that establishing an ESOP and
receiving its benefits had nothing to do with giving employees any say in running the company.  The
audience applauded.  Another attendee expressed concern at "letting the monkeys run the zoo."
In meetings like these, still being held all across the country, thousands of bankers, accountants, and
attorneys gather, looking for new niches in a competitive economy.  They become advocates of and
specialists in the field of employee ownership but have no real interest in labor, except as it
represents a new valuable commodity called "employee owners".
Not only was labor legitimately cynical in the 1980s about this development, but others, including
members of Congress concerned about declining tax revenues and an enormous federal deficit, could
see the program was, in fact, one more corporate income tax break.  This important ESOP legislation
therefore remains vulnerable to assault in the name of  tax reform and deficit reduction due to the
early misuse of its provisions.
Employee ownership was touted and extolled by the corporate community and its apologists as the
pinnacle of labor management cooperation, or "worker capitalism."  It was rarely defined in light of
labor's unique capacities and interests.  Ownership was advanced as different from the militant
tradition of labor rather than as an extension of that tradition.  The early stances of the Knights of
Labor, William Silvis of the National Labor Union, and others who were militant labor leaders and
who supported employee ownership were ignored.
Labor’s Own Weakness in Entering the Field
Labor's internal weaknesses contributed to its ambivalence towards employee ownership.  While the
American economy was expanding from World War II through the mid 1970's, labor leadership did
not need a sophisticated analysis of the business and financial aspects of a company in order to
secure a good contract or settle grievances.  In large-scale industry, better wages and benefits were
provided in exchange for labor peace and for labor distance from management--hence the all-
inclusive "management rights" clauses that are a standard feature in union contracts.  But employee
ownership requires a very sophisticated corporate analysis even in its preliminary stages.  As a result,
many labor leaders were not prepared to grapple with the various aspects of acquisitions and
management of production.
This insecurity produced at least three responses.  One was to recoil from opportunity, where labor
did not engage the issues actively, and became ineffective in bargaining over details.  This resulted in
companies that failed or agreements that were imposed on the workforce contrary to labor's interests.
One early example was South Bend Lathe, represented by the Steelworkers Union before the USWA
became the most sophisticated union at negotiating buyouts.  At South Bend Lathe, anti-labor
policies in an employee-owned company resulted in a strike by "worker owners" against their own
company.  Production was quickly shipped overseas.  In other situations, union leaders--often with
militant leftist rhetoric--condemned the approach and missed important opportunities to protect and
expand labor’s interests.
A second response by labor was to move ahead, but turn over key analytical work and decisions to a
variety of "expert" consultants or technicians who did not necessarily share or understand real labor
interests.  In an interview with the local president and the chief steward of United Food and
Commercial Workers  Local 46, representing the workers at Rath Packing Company,6  the officers
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identified the union’s abdication of control over the Board of Directors as one the main reasons for
the failure of the company. Union leaders were intimidated by the supposed "complexity" of the
buyout and turned over majority control to outside experts who did not share their interests.
A third reaction to insecurity was passivity--failure to get training to keep pace with and sort out the
decisions and analytical problems that the fast-moving acquisition process required. How adequate is
the feasibility study and how solid are the options it presents?  What are the key issues in the
negotiations to finance the company, or to write its by-laws, or in the sale?  What is the new role for
a union in a company where the dues payers are also the owners?  How do you use consultants yet
retain control of the process?  How do you raise the level of understanding and engagement of the
employees during the sometimes chaotic process of transfer of ownership?  Lack of training on these
issues has caused well-intentioned, labor-initiated buy-out efforts to stumble.
This void in direction was partially filled by individuals and emerging consulting organizations like
CLCR, The ICA Group, the Philadelphia Association of Cooperative Enterprises, Locker Associates,
American Capital Strategies, and others, but the new capacity was not enough to meet the demand.
During the 1980's, factory closings became part of the harsh reality of industrial America.  Some
companies, trying to avoid the huge costs of closing a plant, sought to sell the assets and liabilities to
workers.  As reported in the Wall Street Journal, the proposal for workers to buy Weirton Steel in
Weirton, W. Va., was initiated by the president of National Steel as one way to avoid the huge costs
of a closing and to sell off the risk of continued operation.  Fortunately, Weirton became a success,
but that was not always the case.
Other companies doomed to collapse were bought by workers in desperate efforts to save their jobs.
Their decisions in the marketplace were guided by emotion and fear rather than effective analysis,
and as a result, some of the early buyouts failed.  This deepened labor's suspicion of employee
ownership instead of increasing labor sophistication on the variables essential for success.  The
media often focused on these failures, characterizing them as the only examples of worker
ownership, reinforcing the notion that workers do not have what it takes to manage production
effectively.
In situations where business variables were favorable and labor had control, worker managers and
directors were often ill-prepared to use their new power to run the company in new ways.  In the
post-World War II period, many unions became bureaucratized and lost their character as training
schools for democracy.  Leadership frequently became alienated from the rank and file.  Internal
education and training became an unknown in many locals.
When employees took over a company, they lacked skills for effective participatory management.
Their model was frequently the inept management team they were replacing.  Many problems of the
old company, including internal divisions in the workforce, were therefore recycled into the new
company and contributed to failed employee buyouts.  That was clearly the reason for the collapse of
Bankers Print, an employee-owned printing company in Chicago whose conversion was assisted by
CLCR.
A final factor in the difficulties faced by employee buyouts, particularly in the early days, was lack of
support from the labor movement.  Groups of workers, in the main, were left to their own resources
and wisdom if they pursued an employee buyout.  If they made the purchase and had problems, they
were left, in some cases, to "twist in the wind."  Union critics predicted that declines in wage rates in
a buyout package would lower bargaining standards, but then silently accepted the loss of jobs in
companies that could have been saved by informed buyout efforts.  This "hands-off" stance
encouraged anti-union sentiment in employee owners, left them with no choice but traditional
attorneys and consultants during the acquisition, and made them and the companies they purchased
unnecessarily vulnerable.  As a result, a common question raised by a dues-paying union member in
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a shop that is considering a buyout is, "Why do we have to pay union dues and stay in the union,
when we own the company?"
An insidious by-product of this attitude is that some employee-owned companies see themselves as
standing alone and "minding their own business" rather than linked in solidarity and collaboration
with other workers and the broader community. Unfortunately, this was a slogan naively adopted by
a network assisting employee buyouts.   In one situation, the employee owners of a company turned a
deaf ear on a request for assistance from a group of employees seeking to buy another firm out of the
fear in their own management that the new company could become a competitor.  Rather than
grapple with the challenges of competition, they saw the world in zero-sum terms and took the short-
sighted and narrow view.  In Chicago, a small employee-owned company tried to defend its actions
in securing sub-contracts from larger companies as a way to avoid union wages.  It went out of
business.
Moving Forward on the High Road
We need to challenge the view that labor's interest in employee ownership is merely as a last resort in
keeping a company open, or that it is only an opportunity for a few workers and managers to have a
good job and a good investment.  These reasons are important, but to limit our reasons to these leaves
us vulnerable to the consequences of the "hollowing" American economy--capital flight, de-
industrialization, out-sourcing, etc.  We also fall victim to the anarchy of our economy that permits
thousands of companies to fail, only because they don't have an owner to step in when the current
owner retires.  If we do not develop a more aggressive stance towards these issues, we will miss an
opportunity to give specific definition to the growing movement for greater democracy in our
country (and around the world).  We will also fail to demonstrate the potential for an economy that
places recognition and respect for labor at the heart of its values.  Labor and its friends must continue
to develop a comprehensive approach to ownership that combines an aggressive policy with practical
capacity to use the skills and creativity of the rank and file.
We need to affirm by example that ownership is more than a stock certificate or profit sharing.  We
need to take up the issue of democratic management with enthusiasm and commitment. We need to
show how this makes companies more productive and efficient.  We need to demonstrate how
companies become places that transform and develop employees in positive and dynamic ways.  We
must fight the deeply-held view that workers do not have the ability to manage complex enterprises,
much less manage in a democratic way.
We have paid a lot of attention to deals and legal structures.  Greater attention needs to go to shop
floor education, to pro-labor participatory management models, to the use of technology, and to the
culture of cooperative ownership.  Some of this experimental work is developing in cooperatives and
other employee-owned companies and needs to be expanded.
We must confront the issue of employee-owned companies "minding their own business," or what is
called by some, "enterprise consciousness."  Of course, they must succeed if they can solve the
problems within their walls, make all the hard but necessary decisions, and benefit from what they
have accomplished.  But it is critical that employee owners come to see themselves as part of a
broader movement where they can benefit from the experience and resources of others, where they
can contribute to solving problems that others face, and where they can weave together the threads of
a broader economy based on principles they uphold within their own walls.
A company based on a spirit of solidarity--collective action, reciprocity, unity--in short, a labor
vision-- can be both a dynamic producer of wealth and can be an economic institution with a
powerful positive social impact.  This spirit has to be extended beyond the single firm.  The labor
movement, with its existing organizations, is in the best position to facilitate this development.
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In this way, the union preserves its distinct functions and responsibilities.  It's important that the labor
movement not allow workers to "twist in the wind" or be forced to turn to consultants, financiers, and
others who promote a narrow vision of employee ownership at labor's expense.  The initial steps
have been taken for this type of collaboration.  They must expand as quickly as possible.
In this context, we should point to worker ownership as a model with much broader implications for
how our economy is managed.  We should challenge a narrowness and defensiveness that has
reduced the power of this approach.   Of equal importance is the exposure of instances where the
concept of  “worker ownership” is being used to mask a Low Road development agenda.
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Chapter 8:  Business and the High Road
Conventional public attitude towards the business community is “either you love ‘em or you hate
‘em.”  This is a by-product of the old social contract that reserved stewardship of the economy to
capitalists and their managers.  Mainstream leaders accepted this relationship and were comfortable
allowing business this powerful role.  Of course, in exceptional moments, public officials would
attack business in general or a particular company or an executive, usually   because they had done
something really egregious or the officials were negotiating for a bigger chunk of the pie.
On the left, a very strong “anti-corporate” sentiment lumps all companies, and sometimes all
employers--big and small, for profit and not-for-profit--into the same camp.  Some sections of this
left pursue popular campaigns on behalf of labor, community, the environment, or democratic rights.
They engage in militant action and sharply expose the oppressive role of corporate America, but their
demands usually boil down to “more” or “less” within the traditional paradigm.  They cede to hated
corporate America the right to make the key decisions regarding the economy.  These conventional
approaches are paralyzing and ineffective in today’s climate, and cannot capture the imagination or
intelligence of the American people.  From our strategic perspective, the business community falls
into three categories:
# business on the Low Road,
# our tactical allies--those who share at least a material interest in our objectives, and
# our strategic allies--those who share our vision of the High Road.
We need to distinguish among them and develop appropriate strategies for each sector.
Businesses on the Low Road
We know who they are and see their work with increasing frequency.  It is not enough to
acknowledge their presence.  We need to frame the discussion of their practices in terms of broader
community interests and development of productive capacity.   To do so is a requirement of
representing the public’s interest in community development.
We need to isolate these Low Road companies from other sections of the business and broader
community, who now tend to allow them to defend their narrow interests.  Whether this is because of
class solidarity, apathy, or conviction, it is a tremendous impediment to progress.  Sharp material
differences exist between the corporate-raider and “cash-cow milker” that will drain a local company
of its value and close its doors, and the local machine shop down the street that depends on the
business of that same “cash cow” for its survival.  Yet local government, the community
development activists and prominent community banks remain frightfully silent about the destructive
practices of a small but very influential segment of the private sector.  Their silence only reinforces
the destructive myth that all corporations are the same and that they somehow have the God-given
right to remain “private.”
We need to win in our conflicts with businesses on the Low Road to give others confidence that
opposing them is a step toward influence and momentum.  We need to frame the conflict so it is
accurately seen as opposing bad business in support of good business.  We don’t want it
misperceived as  “anti-business” or “anti-corporate.”  But exposing this destructive segment of the
private sector is not enough.  Low Road behavior must be blocked and stopped, and punished when
appropriate, in the same way we punish destructive practices in the underground market, or in society
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as a whole.  Some laws against illegitimate corporate practices are only enforced periodically.  These
need to be updated and applied consistently in light of real conditions.
The company I worked for--Taylor Forge--was being destroyed because of a strategy promoting
shareholder return without considering the destruction it caused in families and the community.  It
dawned on me that if, in a rage, I grabbed a baseball bat and broke car windows on Cicero Avenue, I
would go to jail.  On the other hand, if I had $50 or $60 million, bought a company on Cicero
Avenue and wrecked it in the course of making my stockholders more money, I would be written up
in Crain’s Chicago Business as a “tough but smart” business leader.
In our marketplace, companies expertly wrap themselves in positive descriptions.  Effective public
relations puts the best possible spin on their contribution to society or the compelling reasons why
they do what they do.  Despite the fluff, their practices de-develop our communities and corrode and
destroy our productive capacity.
The quest for short-term shareholder value is not only destructive to communities and workers, but
also can be destructive to long-term shareholder value.  Successful speculation is not the same as
successful business.   Underlying this misunderstanding is greed, of course, but also a deliberate
blindness and a culture of selfishness. Equally corrosive are the policies of executive compensation
that reward practices incredibly destructive to a community, a company, or industry’s health.
This does not mean that all companies that pay a minimum wage, or that are involved in a dispute
with labor or with the public, or who have a process that is not sound should be labeled the enemy.
We should be careful with our labeling, acknowledging that, in some cases, a company’s practices
are contrary to public interest but the solution is complicated.  On the other hand, when we have a
company that is clearly and intentionally on the Low Road, it is essential that we act when we can to
expose, block, and oppose.
Our Tactical Allies
Our tactical allies are companies that have a short-term material intersection with our objectives, but
do not necessarily agree with our whole development program.  These include the majority of
companies that have a local market and depend on a thriving local economy. A large number of
companies are still locally owned.  Their success depends on a strong social and economic
infrastructure.  Their managers and owners have often worked themselves up from production
positions, and come from working class communities.  They are familiar and sympathetic with the
conditions, worries, and concerns of the majority of people.
These allies include investors, entrepreneurs, executives, and others who are fair and recognize our
common interest.  Some companies, because of the nature of their production, require the kind of
society our strategic objectives seek.  Many high-technology companies want a community with a
highly developed infrastructure that will provide a steady flow of highly educated and motivated
workers.  Their productivity depends on decentralized authority and initiative rather than the rigid,
assembly-type production process known as Taylorism.  But the fact that they have a material
interest in our program does not mean they recognize that or step forward.  It is our job to highlight
this common interest, provide them with appropriate material benefit when possible, and effectively
break our own habit of lumping all parts of the private sector together.
Our Strategic Allies
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In the business community there are businesses, large and small, and business leaders who accept the
main features of our strategic vision.  They are absolutely essential for the success of our new
development strategy.  They have essential skills and resources to complement those of labor and
community.
These are individuals who can be found working in most Low Road companies, who are often
required to act in a certain way because of their job or immediate situation, but who have a high level
of consciousness and commitment to the High Road. Finding individuals like these is like finding
diamonds, and our social movement should never close its eyes to this possibility.
Mid and lower-level managers in some Low Road companies may also share a commitment to
further develop the productive capacity of the company and can find themselves in fundamental
conflict with strategies that threaten it.  In short, whole classes of company owners and managers can
be our strategic allies.  These include employee owners of companies, micro entrepreneurs, and
“minority” and women entrepreneurs who bring strong values and commitment into their business
practices.
Our specific program for tactical and strategic business allies outlines the unique features we bring to
business development.  These include:  linking successful companies with sustainable objectives;
giving priority to work with social, female, and minority entrepreneurs; developing the full capacity
of labor within the business, and building a mutually beneficial relationship with community and
local government.
Brach Candy Company
In 1989, at the request of a local community coalition called the Garfield/Austin Interfaith Action
Network (GAIN), CLCR became involved in a protracted effort to save jobs at Chicago’s Brach
Candy Company.7  This campaign provided a great opportunity to define the interests, actions, and
roles of the various parts of the private sector connected to the company and to develop strategies
appropriate to these varied interests.
In 1987, this West Side company had employed some 3,700 people and generated $80 million in
payroll revenues that circulated through the local economy, yearly.  The company was purchased by
Klaus Jacobs, a Swiss entrepreneur.  By 1989, he had laid off 1,000 people, replaced four CEOs and
management teams, lost about $100 million in sales, and threatened to close the company if the City
of Chicago didn’t set up a Free Trade Zone that would permitted Brach to buy sugar at reduced
international prices.
CLCR established a partnership between GAIN, the Teamster local that represented the production
workers, some of the management of the company including Peter Rogers,  a prominent Brach ex-
CEO and a coalition of 80 organizations.  The Campaign sought a High Road future for Brach:
# an effort by managers and employees to buy the company, as well as a proposal to own the
manufacturing facility jointly with Klaus Jacobs.  Jacobs rejected both proposals.
# proposals for significant changes in the organization of production, worker participation in
management, profit sharing, and the building of an effective relationship with the local
community and the city.  We proposed that the company  let contracts for goods and services
to local companies where feasible, expanding the market for existing businesses and creating
the opportunity for business start-ups.
# a relatively bitter campaign to prevent the company from implementing a Low Road strategy.  It
wanted to cut wages and benefits of the workers, but the union and coalition instead won a
good four year contract.
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# a successful defense by CLCR and the Coalition against a civil SLAPP8 suit filed by Brach in a
Low Road effort to destroy us financially.  The Teamsters Union took the High Road and
provided legal defense for all defendants, even though the union itself had not been sued.
CLCR conducted a Social/Cost Benefit Study9 to quantify the impact of the projected loss of 2,048
jobs at Brach Candy Company in 1990.  We found that over two years there would be:
# a loss of 4,723 additional jobs in the state economy,
# a loss of $91.6 million to the government, including lost taxes and increased welfare and
unemployment benefit spending.
The victims would be the companies that had a material interest in supporting our labor/community
coalition--packaging companies, producers of the raw materials Brach used in production,
transportation companies, and others that were part of the production chain associated with Brach’s
candies.  The health of these companies depended on the success of our labor/community coalition.
Accountants, lawyers, bankers, and consultants also had an interest in our success.  Within Brach, the
labor/community coalition had the active support of some top-level managers who knew they could
lose their own jobs if the Low Road strategy prevailed.
Part of the success of the “Save Brach’s” Coalition Campaign came from recognizing these common
interests, winning over some representatives of the private sector to our efforts, and advancing
objectives that clearly encouraged and supported good business just as we opposed bad business
practices.  We successfully challenged the labor and community activist’s habit of treating the
business community as a monolith.
Mayor Daley of Chicago sided with Brach managers in the conflict with the Teamsters and the
Coalition.  And then, in the midst of the conflict, Brach’s low-wage competitor that was solidly on the
Low Road--paying minimum wage, a history of abuse of immigrants, and rabidly anti-union--
requested and received a city subsidy of $3 million.  This city policy was a by-product of a habit that
treats the private sector monolithically and tries to respond to every request without a careful
evaluation of its impact on the city and other companies.  This type of policy encourages the Low
Road.
A local not-for-profit development corporation had been seeking Brach as a member for 16 years with
no success.  Shortly after our Coalition held a press conference attacking the Low Road strategy of the
new owner, the development corporation received a check for dues from the Brach’s CEO and gladly
accepted the money and the company into its ranks.  This passive deference to the private sector by a
CDC receiving tax breaks to serve the local community is not uncommon.  It breeds public cynicism
about the field of community development.
Through our work at Brach, we became familiar with the candy industry in Chicago.  To our surprise,
we learned that the Chicago area produces more candy than any other city in the world, with about 50
manufacturers plus many smaller candy makers employing 10,000 people and generating $2.4 billion
in shipments. 10  It is a sector that can afford good wages because of the skills and talents of Chicago’s
labor and management pool.
Along with our strategic and tactical allies in the private sector, the unions that represent candy
workers, and others from community, education, and government, we have created the Candy
Institute, committed to building this industry on the High Road.  The Candy Institute is developing
and implementing programs on technology, training and education, production, marketing, export, and
innovation.  As this industry faces increasing global competition, an effective public/private
partnership will rise to the challenge.
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Entrepreneurs on the High Road
Entrepreneurs are leaders in the market of any economy.  They start up and buy companies.  They are
investors and financiers.  They make things happen.  They have the leadership characteristics and
skills to succeed.  They act according to their values.  We need to cultivate entrepreneurs who will
lead in developing the economy in line with our strategic vision, retaining and improving assets that
are now deteriorating, and envisioning and creating new assets.
Part of our new model of community development involves transforming the field of development
itself.  It is now a passive service provider to the private sector, but it can play an entrepreneurial and,
therefore, competitive role in determining the future use and value of the assets of our community.
Key to our success is identifying, recruiting, developing, and rewarding a breed of entrepreneur who
will lead in the marketplace, but do it with a full commitment to our social and community values as
well as to the bottom line.  Success will give us the capacity to create enormous financial and social
opportunity, either through transforming a reactive retention project into an engine for development,
or identifying an undervalued community resource or asset and developing it.
These entrepreneurs are our strategic allies in the business community and represent a relationship
that is worth a lot of investment and patience.  What are their characteristics?
# They have the capacity and skill to succeed in the marketplace and to generate a return for their
investors and themselves in creative and competitive ways.
# They promote their success in the context of a new paradigm of development, illustrated by
model projects and new policy.
# They preserve, at all costs, the strategic alliance of labor, community, and business.  They deal
with the inherent tensions and conflicts with skill and good judgment and patience.
# They are aggressive in increasing their profit margins as well as those of their customers and
allies.
# They have an authentic commitment to their employees and the host community.
# They seek critical review of their work and accept accountability.
Entrepreneurs with these qualities should be our preferred vendors and participants in our networks
and our projects.  They bring far more value to us than traditional entrepreneurs with equivalent or
even superior skill.
57
Chapter 9:  Community and the High Road
The traditional model for development has generally reflected the values of economically advantaged
groups.  Regardless of our own particular desires, development has occurred as a reflection of the
rich upon the poor.  Our vision challenges this model11.  Current conditions make the necessary space
for a fundamental shift of the development paradigm toward a model that sets the economic and
social needs of the whole society, particularly its most oppressed, as the target of development.  In
this model, the costs and role of labor, democratic management, corporate obligations to the
community, and environmentally productive technology are not seen as restraints on development
but as dynamic benefits that can drive and develop our productive capacity.
The idea of empowering a community to wage its own fight against poverty and urban decay is not
new.  For the last 30 years, thousands of organizations supported by billions of dollars in private and
public funds have been involved in community development work, and many dedicated practitioners
have sought to achieve that goal with enormous creativity.
Community development strategies used to unfold within the framework of a relatively stable and
expanding economy.  Activists could launch campaigns expecting at least some of the fruits of
growth to be available for development work, without necessarily challenging society’s basic
structure.  Campaigns demanding to redistribute wealth produced results.  That is often no longer the
case.
In the last ten years, a small but significant number of organizations are experimenting with new
approaches and new relationships.
# Banana Kelly, a housing development corporation in the South Bronx, is working in partnership
with the Natural Resource Defense Council to create a new paper de-inking company.  This company
would gather waste paper, take the ink out using environmentally-sound production processes, build a
large modern and attractive factory in the community, hire hundreds of community residents as
workers, and be owned, in part, by the community.
# In Cleveland, WireNet is expanding an early warning system working closely and effectively
with the manufacturing community to retain good manufacturing jobs.
# A growing network of organizations are advancing “asset-based strategies” that seek to link  jobs
and income with the accumulation, investment, and management of assets.  A number of
organizations such as the Corporation for Enterprise Development are exploring ways that very low-
income people can become active in the local economy.
# The Women’s Self-Employment Project in Chicago is using micro-enterprise as a starting point
for women to advance and participate in the broader economy.  They are assisting these tiny
businesses, led by women who have typically been excluded from the economy, to grow and gain the
skills and resources that will allow them to effectively compete.
These organizations and many others like them represent a leadership infrastructure and resource
network that is committed to community development and provides important assistance in a range
of community economic development activities.  In many cases, these organizations have already
developed innovative models and projects in line with the strategic direction advanced in this paper.
A Critique of the Traditional Community Development Model
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The majority of development organizations,however, hold on to traditional assumptions that had
more merit under the previous social contract.  In today’s environment they are transparently
ineffective in truly representing the interests of poor communities.  In many cases these community
development corporations have become little more than a form of traditional trade association,
providing low-cost services to local businesses--possible because of the not-for-profit status they
receive from the government.
In some cases, development corporations have become active participants in development strategies
that are gentrifying urban neighborhoods.  This has accelerated displacement of residents who have
no hope of the income needed to benefit from the “commercial revitalization” of their community,
and has accelerated the loss of manufacturing jobs and companies.  Owners of companies, however,
are offered enormous sums for their sites by developers, which allows them to cash out on the value,
and they have the money to relocate--frequently out of the city.  They make a handsome profit to
boot.
During the Vietnam Era, we were stunned when a general announced that he had to “destroy the
village in order to save it.”  Some in the field of community development are now “destroying the
community so they can develop it.”
Overall, these development organizations have lowered their sights to marginal types of business
activities, ignoring what really drives the health or decline of a community.  They are passive in their
supply of services, not entrepreneurial in the recognition, defense, and development of the human
and material assets of the community.  They are seeking “jobs” for the community without
distinguishing the jobs that develop the community and the individual from jobs that break them
down.  After all, slavery once was full employment for the African-American community.  Our
concern must be with the quality of jobs, and we must recognize  that a job does not necessarily
represent progress.  Dialectics teaches us that every job has some positive qualities as well as some
negative ones but from a community standpoint, we must seek jobs whose positives outweigh their
negatives.
# In large measure, development groups have avoided manufacturing either because its problems
seemed too complex or its owners were too powerful and influential.  With some notable exceptions,
most organizations and most resources have focused on housing, retail, and commercial projects.
They understand and are expert in understanding the physical side of community development--
infrastructure, housing, transportation--and the associated financial details.  Many of those who have
focused on manufacturing approached it from the real estate side, considering placement or retention
of any manufacturing company a success without evaluating which sectors benefitted the community
in contrast to those that didn’t.
# Labor--both organized and unorganized--is usually viewed by development groups as just a cost,
and in many cases as one of the enemies.  But labor was and is a key strategic component of
community development.  Labor is rarely included on the board of directors or as part of the
leadership core in launching initiatives.  When it is included, it is too often only in token fashion.
# Development groups often see the “private sector” as a monolith that must be passively praised
and served rather than as divided into those who promote “good business” from a community
standpoint and those who do not.  To treat both kinds the same way is ironic and unfortunate, and lies
at the heart of community cynicism about the field.
# The “community” in community development typically has a token relationship with the
organization , which may have relatively little grass roots participation on its board.  Many CDCs are
business development organizations that receive tax breaks yet are not accountable for their
stewardship of the assets of the community.
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# The community development corporation is often not truly entrepreneurial, remaining
comfortable in providing services passively--responding to a demand without closely evaluating the
company making the request or determining the real benefit to the community.
# The organization’s criteria for success rarely includes clear objectives in measuring and
alleviating poverty.  Community development is measured instead in dollars flowing into a
community.  It is common for development corporations or development banks to point to the dollar
amount they have brought in, which may represent poverty alleviation but may also represent poor
people pushed out of the community by “market” pressures.
# In areas such as minority business development the CDC is often oriented toward entrepreneurial
training programs that involve micro or small business start-ups, and these typically have a high
failure rate.  Many of the devices are useful, such as sheltered markets, set-asides and low cost
financing.  Micro-enterprise and self-employment can be an effective entry point into the economy for
women of color who have been excluded from traditional channels for example.  However, these
programs need to be linked to comprehensive community development on a larger scale appropriate to
the problem.
# In training programs, development corporations have accepted contracts that fund their staff, but
have not accepted the responsibility of  linking training with permanent placement, or in judging
placed trainees by their wage levels, or by their access to jobs that provide good wages.
# In staff and executive compensation, many of these corporations handsomely reward the
practitioner but do not link the pay to appropriate standards of performance in developing the
community.  A leader in the traditional development field was asked whether his national agency was
focused on retaining and creating high wage jobs in the community, in contrast to low wage jobs.  He
answered, “No...except for the staff of our agency.”   This kind of professional was regularly
castigated in the 1960s as a “poverty pimp” who makes personal fortune in the name but not in the
substance of serving the community.
These traditional community development organizations are not well positioned socially or
politically to respond to the crises and opportunities in our communities.  They have been unable to
advocate policy options that challenge established boundaries of business ownership and control, or
of public accountability.  They are often unable to promote government intervention in the affairs of
local businesses and lack the resources necessary to mobilize the community behind a comprehensive
development policy.
An Emerging Vision of Community Development
We begin with the premise that poverty is firmly linked to the disinvestment and deindustrialization
occurring in our communities.  Development therefore depends upon a willingness to use every
resource at our disposal to reclaim and improve a community's productive base.  First, we must retain
what exists, preserving these assets as a foundation for future development.
Our second premise is that the business sector as a whole is not an adequate sole source of
information about community assets.  Other sources must provide further information to guide our
actions, whatever they are.  After all, no serious member of  the investment community relies on one
source of information.  We must have timely and accurate information about all the assets of our
community as a foundation for any action that we take.
The New York Industrial Retention Network
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In New York City, a network of local development corporations including the Brooklyn Economic
Development Corporation, the East Williamsburg Valley Industrial Development Corporation, the
Fifth Avenue Committee, and the Pratt Institute Center for Community and Environmental
Development joined the Central Labor Council, local businesses, community-based organizations, and
local and state governments to form the New York Industrial Retention Network (NYIRN).  This
network was a product of a pilot project in Brooklyn initiated by CLCR and Locker Associates.12  It
gathers public data on local companies from the press, from databases, and information published by
the companies themselves.  It combines this with other information from employees, customers,
residents, accountants, and suppliers and distributers of local companies. Participants include Chase
Manhattan Bank, utilities like Brooklyn Union Gas and Consolidated Edison, and business service
companies like Coopers and Lybrand.  They have an interest in keeping their customers in place and
viable and are willing to work with us.
With this public and private data, NYIRN makes an analysis of companies at risk or in need of
assistance (including those considering relocation because of growth).  It puts into motion a range of
resources that can solve the kinds of problems that have cost this metropolitan area so many valuable
industrial jobs over the last 20 years.  The diversity of this network, combined with the competency
and commitment of its board and staff, make it an effective initiator of community development
activity.
A major component and opportunity of an industrial retention program revolves around ownership.
Technical and financial assistance, public intervention, and appropriate public policy can solve a
number of problems if targeted and delivered effectively.  Labor’s expanded use of employee
ownership has established local, popular control of a significant number of companies in the last 15
years.  With many companies, particularly small ones, the need is only to find new qualified owners,
often available in the local community but overlooked by the traditional market.
Who owns the company and what values and priorities guide their business plan?  This is the critical
determinant of how production is organized, the link between the company and other companies or
the community; its patterns of employment and training, and the level of commitment to affirmative
action and environmental standards.  Learning who owns a company is one of the most important
opportunities for those concerned with economic development on a community level.
We must be prepared to have people with our values and priorities purchase and develop local
industries.  This can be accomplished in a number of ways: employee ownership, community shares
in local companies plus positions on the Board of Directors, and ownership by local entrepreneurs
directly linked to community initiatives and organizations.  In these ways, we can most directly
promote development with new standards and objectives consistent with community needs.
To mobilize the grassroots support necessary to our vision, the relationship of an enterprise to the
community must change in three fundamental ways.  First, we must democratize the workplace itself.
This involves seeking non-discrimination and affirmative action, greater control by working people
over safety and other conditions of work, and greater participation by employees in matters affecting
their lives, which have traditionally been reserved exclusively for management. Second, we must
democratize relations among enterprises of the community.  This requires facilitating their
cooperation with and support for each other, and their common support for the community as a
whole. Third, we must democratize the relationship of the enterprise to the community by finding
ways for the community to evaluate and monitor a business's contribution to its overall economic,
social and cultural growth.  In these ways, we begin to socialize and democratize the use of the
market.
This focus, guided by an appreciation of the power of  manufacturing to development, can create a
foundation for other forms of commercial and retail development.  If necessary, legal tools like
eminent domain must be exploited to facilitate the acquisition of factories which might otherwise be
dismantled.  We refuse to treat any community as expendable and are confident that many businesses
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could operate more profitably if the community were mobilized in their support.
In order for this to happen there must be a basis for that support.  This is possible when our vision of
development:
# creates companies that are the most productive and efficient in their sectors and in the economy,
and generate a return adequate to reward investors;
# recognizes and celebrates the dynamic and positive role of labor and does not fear labor costs;
# is premised on and committed to the eradication of poverty and discrimination;
# sees affirmative action as an opportunity to recover initiative and talent stifled and crushed by
racism and male privilege, rather than a drag on business freedom;
# stands for ecologically sustainable development;
# is linked to a community umbrella organization through ownership and/or involvement; and
# does not fear democratic and participatory forms of management and development knowing that
such forms contribute directly to the cultural growth and education of our people and to the training of
new leaders.  These can be linked directly to increased efficiency, productivity, and creativity in
production.
But if communities are to be mobilized in support of such projects, commercial viability, while a
necessary condition of success, is not sufficient.  Typically, a community's resources and objectives
are seen through the wrong end of a telescope -- everything is diminished and narrowed.  We cannot
hope to mobilize a community to serve only the short-term self-interest of an individual entrepreneur.
Instead, a long-term and comprehensive analysis of the health and well being of a community must
guide its support.
What we envision is not a narrow application of cost accounting categories to evaluate success, but
decisions that are based on a "Social Cost/benefit Analysis."   This method recognizes the full costs
to a community of such things as homelessness, limited education, malnutrition, alcoholism, health
problems, crime, and environmental degradation.  We must also see the cost-benefits of  job training,
education, cultural development, and heightened community organization and sociability.
In order to accomplish these objectives, persons and resources habitually left out of the traditional
development community must be mobilized.  Labor, organized and unorganized, is the major
element of our productive capacity.  Organized labor is an essential agent of economic and social
change.  The decline of union  membership has made unions more open to work with new partners.
Labor must be challenged to organize in poor and distressed communities much more imaginatively
than it ever has, and to organize around community development as well as traditional labor issues.
Rebuilding and expanding the labor/community coalition is fundamental to the success of this
strategic vision.
Refashioning the Structure of Community Development
Our strategy requires four organizational components:
# The enterprise development company, a center for the technical side of development.
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# Linked enterprise networks that coordinate the activities of companies in a sector.
# The community umbrella organization that holds the development process accountable to
community needs.
# A political structure that will represent the development vision in the fight for control of
government and its resources.
The Enterprise Development Company (EDC)
The enterprise development company (or a similar capacity within other organizational structures) is
established to provide the full range of services and expertise needed to acquire, manage and develop
businesses consistent with the social and economic goals of a broader coalition.  Such expertise is not
found under rocks, but can be developed from within our midst.
If the EDC is a for-profit company, then it can be owned by a not-for-profit company to insure the
recycling of its surplus into other aspects of community development.  The EDC can function as a
clearinghouse for information about local businesses gathered from a broad early-warning network of
sources, including churches, community organizations, development corporations, city government,
labor unions, and residents.  It may be run by or work closely with unions and churches themselves.
The EDC will assist a company in developing financial resources through contacts with individuals,
venture funds, banks and grant sources, and will also provide technical services such as accounting,
legal, marketing, and management assistance.  In all its activities, the EDC seeks to establish a long-
term position of influence or control over the company, formal or informal, in order to monitor
performance and assure achievement of community goals.  Thus an EDC might have representation
on the Board of Directors of a local enterprise or own the company outright.
Many community development corporations either provide these services now or are positioned to
provide them.  Chicago Focus, Inc., a subsidiary of the Center for Labor and Community Research, is
an example of an EDC.  It is a for-profit full-service merger and acquisition company wholly owned
by a non-profit organization devoted to community economic development.  Chicago Focus gets
leads on acquisition opportunities through CLCR, unions, local government, and the development
community, and has developed a pool of minority and other entrepreneurs interested in buying
manufacturing companies and who are committed to keeping jobs in Chicago.
Cooperative Home Care Associates
The Cooperative Home Care Associates (CHCA) is another such company in the home health
care field.  CHCA established a successful cooperative home health care company in the Bronx, NY
employing over 300 workers.  The CHCA model has influenced industry standards and increasingly
influences the character of the industry in New York.  They have now established similar companies
in other cities.
Steel Valley Authority
The Steel Valley Authority (SVA) in the Pittsburgh area has a similar structure.  It was created in
1989 by the Tri-State Conference on Steel--a religion/community/labor industrial-retention coalition.
The SVA maintains an active multi-county early warning network, has been granted the power of
eminent domain, has been active in several employee buyouts in the region, and has provided
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technical assistance to local companies.  The SVA and the USWA are creating the Industral Valleys
Investment Fund for the Pittsburgh area and established the Heartland Project to explore the creation
of a fund to service a broader multi-state region and finance employee acquisition, restructuring, and
the turn around of manufacturing companies.
The Linked Enterprise Network
Our concept of the linked enterprise network has taken inspiration from the Mondragon network of
industrial cooperatives in the Basque region of Spain, flexible manufacturing districts in Northern
Italy, and various U.S. efforts at organizing for community control.  Even in an informal network,
facilitating contacts among community enterprises can encourage local business to stay in the area,
foster common purchasing and marketing arrangements, promote training and educational programs,
provide sites for employment training of residents, and establish links between enterprises and other
community organizations.  At its most ambitious, the network seeks to tie these companies together
formally to pool capital and resources for development and collectively to create educational,
cultural, and research institutions that are collectively capable of providing greater economic strength
and leadership.
Garment Industry Development Corporation
The last 15 years have seen creation of a number of relatively successful networks.  One of the first
was the Garment Industry Development Corporation (GIDC).  Initiated by the International Ladies
Garment Workers Union in partnership with New York City government and the garment companies,
GIDC was organized first in response to an industry crisis about maintaining its location in
Chinatown.  The  program has evolved to include assistance to companies on training, technology,
marketing, and export.  Still centered in New York City, GIDC has provided inspiration and
assistance to other efforts around the country.
 Appalachian Center for Economic Networks
The Appalachian Center for Economic Networks (ACEnet) in Athens Ohio is implementing an “asset-
based strategy” in linking together  40 small companies in the specialty food industry in their Kitchen
Incubator.  In this center, they provide large ovens, stoves, freezers, and work tables so small
companies can respond to growing demand.  More importantly, they provide information on
international markets and resources for their companies.  They share information and expertise on
product development and marketing.  They have established a Product Development Fund that will
financially support these companies in the early stages of taking a new idea to the market.  These
activities are part of a vision of sustainable economy in a rural region, and its working.
Candy Institute
In Chicago, the Candy Institute emerged from the caldron of the campaign to save jobs at Brach
Candy Company.   It is developing programs on bench marking, joint purchasing, combined
production facilities, effective linkages to Chicago’s educational community, and marketing.13
The Umbrella Community Organization
An umbrella community organization is needed to ensure supervision of planning and development
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by the community as a whole. Development objectives should be established by the umbrella
organization, and criteria for success must reflect the community's political vision as well as its
inventory of its own and adjacent physical and human resources.
Key to this strategic concept is the objective of community control of the economy.  This is not
something that can be declared or mandated in the abstract.  No adequately established formula gives
detailed direction to a local project.  It is instead a process that brings more and more people into
economic decisionmaking by:
# education about the real variables, values, and options that undergird the economy;
# interventions in the economy that could include setting up an early warning network, taking part
in a plant closing coalition, participating in a community jobs project, creating a linked enterprise
network, or developing a fund to promote local development;
# working on a buyout or start-up of a local company and joining in the effort to successfully
manage it; or
# developing and advocating development policy for the area and mobilizing grassroots
organizations in coalition with local labor and business groups to fight for its  implementation.
The ability to control is earned, not declared.  At the beginnings of these projects, the level of control
will probably be minuscule.  Effective projects will extend and expand this control systematically
over a period of years.  Generally, we would expect slow initial progress with ebbs and flows
thereafter.  But current conditions permit dramatic growth of these efforts, and leadership must be
prepared for that possibility.
In the same spirit, democracy is created through a process.  A project cannot simply declare that it is
acting on "behalf of the community."  Joint action grows through leadership noting specific
opportunities for development in the community, and bringing in broader and broader circles of
people to participate.  It requires building bridges between labor and local residents, between labor
and management, between community and local business groups, between religious institutions and
community groups, etc.  It must be a forum for training broad, indigenous leadership that can sustain
community development work beyond the tenure of any particular leader or organization.  Our
commitment is to continually extend and strengthen democracy within our own structures as we fight
for more democracy in the broader community and within the society as a whole.
There is no formula for how such an organization can be built.  Examples, however, exist.  Many
community organizations, networks, and coalitions that are providing these services and leadership,
or could easily adopt this approach.
The Naugatuck Valley Project
The Naugatuck Valley Project (NVP) in western Connecticut, a member group of the InterValley
Project, is in many respects characteristic of the kind of coalition we propose.  The NVP is a regional
organization of more than 50 religious, labor, community, and small business groups drawn together
by the dramatic deindustrialization of what was once the center of the American brass industry.
Factories that had been locally owned were sold to multinational conglomerates that, in disinvesting in
the region, gave little thought to the valley's economic survival.  Local communities felt helpless in
the face of industrial collapse.
Organizers for the NVP, however, drew on the experience of community organizing and used those
lessons to mobilize around industrial retention and job growth.  They worked with local trade unions
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to recognize the early warning signs of plant closings, forced bargaining with corporate employers,
arranged an employee buyout, with the help of The ICA Group, drafted legislation unanimously
adopted by the legislature to permit money from a state trust fund to be made available for loans for
worker buyouts, and developed a land trust for cooperative housing.  According to one sympathetic
report, "with chapters in six towns, hundreds of active supporters, and meetings almost daily in one or
another part of the valley, the project has become a vital force in the life of the region."
Sustainable Milwaukee
Over the last five years, Sustainable Milwaukee (SM) has pulled together 80 to 90 local organizations
to provide an overall framework for sustainable development, and to lead projects that apply those
principles on the ground.  SM has provided support for the Milwaukee Regional Training Partnership,
a consortium of 35 metal working companies and their unions committed to establishing common
standards for job training and common programs.
The New Chicago Campaign
Some 20 community, public housing resident, business, environmental, policy, religious, and
development organizations, including CLCR have created the New Chicago Campaign.  They are
developing a blueprint for a sustainable Chicago metropolitan economy.  It is also exploring  several
community business projects including the start-up of companies in the remanufacturing sector.
Recently it targeted the city’s use of a technique called tax increment financing to promote
gentrification of several neighborhoods which results in the displacement of low-income residents and
industrial companies.
Community umbrella organizations insure, for example, that participating enterprises make a
contribution to child care in order to facilitate the development of women’s leadership and job skills.
Environmental and other objectives of the community are monitored by the organization.  It can also
facilitate cooperation among residents so that common needs are met cooperatively.  One way or
another the organization seeks to ensure that programs of adult education, literacy, English language
classes, high school equivalence programs, vocational training, computer training and the like are
available.
The organization facilitates union organizing by developing contacts between unions and
unorganized workers, as have the Asian Immigrant Women Advocates of the San Francisco Bay
Area.  Like that organization, it will concern itself with making medical, legal and other counseling
services accessible to members of the community.  Alternate forms of informal conflict resolution
among neighbors might be found.  Laundry and food co-ops and other cooperatives forms of meeting
essential daily needs could be envisaged.
To lead, the umbrella organization must become a center for the eradication of drug and alcohol
abuse.  In poor communities the drug industry has become a center of entrepreneurial activity for
youth and a symbol of material success.  The umbrella community organization must fashion
alternatives.  It must also mobilize the community to deal with homelessness.  Factories can be
recovered as centers of cultural life and a sites for lectures and plays as well as for work.  Salsedo
Press, an employee-owned company in Chicago, opens its doors to the broader community for a
Christmas Party and Cinco de Mayo/May Day celebration.  But in addition the umbrella organization
must link these actions with issues of economic development into a coherent, consistent program.
Winning Public and Governmental Support for the High Road  
It’s not enough just to work on the practical application of this vision at the company and community
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level. Comprehensive development policy agendas must address the conditions in specific cities,
towns, and communities.  That policy fight needs to be waged in all the sectors and institutions that
help shape public opinion and are designed to serve the public.
The terrain for this work will often be on a local level at a particular company within a particular
community.  Such work must be seen as a step toward creating national industrial and economic
policies that correspond to the needs of labor, community, and the broader public.  We must take the
lessons of these experiences and generalize them in ways that allow their convertibility to national
legislation, policy, and programs.
At the same time,  local work creates the constituency and leadership necessary for the passage and
implementation of national policy.  Implementing these strategies in a particular locale is a way of
training the development movement. National objectives will only be achieved if there is a
determined fight--plant by plant and community by community.
Finally, once these structures are armed with a new strategy for development and have experience in
its application to many communities and companies, they must seek influence and control in the
political and governmental realm.  The market, as a source of resources for this work, typically has
been underestimated.  On the other hand, absolute limits to the market need to be recognized.
It is essential that we focus part of the organizing power of these strategies on the political process.
We need to educate, train, and recruit leaders with political skills and ambition, and they must run for
office, seeking the full resources of local, state, and federal government in support of these
initiatives.
Our policy for government is for it to support and reward those on the High Road of development,
and block and punish those on the Low Road of development.  Our strategy calls for and depends on
government competency and effectiveness.  The unambiguous goal of government and politics must
be that communities are the beneficiaries of development.
We support the use of government to reach our social and economic objectives, but are critical of the
“command” approach to the economy and society, whether it comes from the socialist, social
democratic, or liberal capitalist model.  Strong government must lead and support stronger initiatives
and capacity at the community, firm, family, and individual levels.   Local and micro-level initiatives
must be profoundly linked to the struggle for national policy and effective government.
We seek the greatest possible decentralization of responsibility and capacity as we build the national
capacity to coordinate, promote and defend equality and fairness, and as we develop macro-policies
that promote and extend our goals.  Both government and politics must be linked to the details of
building a sustainable economy as well as to issues of representation, justice, and international
affairs.
In their deliberations, governmental and political leaders should recognize that macro-policies must be
rooted in small-company efficiency within a democratic approach to management and a link to the
immediate community.
Our strategic objectives need political expression on a local and national level.  This can happen both
within existing parties and in new formations.  We work with all in the political community who
support all or some of our objectives as circumstances and capacity permit.  Clearly, the Republican
and Democratic parties are institutionalized creations of the status quo.  Their daily failures and
scandals create more space for new approaches and new formations.  Even they are concerned with
the declining percentage of registered voters that they represent.  Within these parties, as within
business, individuals and caucuses are our tactical and strategic allies.  We must always be looking
for them and working with them when possible.
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Many of the issues this strategy seeks to address, such as entrepreneurial leadership of the economy,
cross over traditional ideological barriers.  Many politically and socially conservative people
completely understand and support our approach to competing within the market for the development
and control of companies.  They grasp what we are suggesting more, in fact, than political leaders
from the left or the progressive social and political agenda, and then they often become open to
seeing other issues in different ways as well.  A number of the projects I have described have been
supported by Republican administrations as well as Democratic ones.
One movement that suggested the power of this approach was the effort to elect and re-elect Harold
Washington as Mayor of Chicago.  He and many of his supporters were deeply committed to the
objectives of this strategy, put resources into its development, and contended for leadership in the
Democratic Party, despite the obstacles.
We now have several contending third parties such as the Labor Party, the Green Party, and the New
Party.  Programmatically, organizationally and culturally, however, they remain anchored in the old
paradigm of development--usually limiting their objectives to new iterations of traditional demands.
Within these parties, though, a large number of activists and leaders have contributed to the
experience that shaped our vision of development and who are part of the effort to articulate and
apply a new strategic approach.  We should persist in reaching out to them in creating a common
platform and plan of action.
These are periods of change in community.  In the context of widespread decay, decline, and human
loss in urban and rural areas, traditional approaches to development and politics are proving to be
inadequate.  There is a new willingness--and sometimes passion--to look at new approaches and new
strategies.
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Chapter 10: Conclusion
In this paper, I have presented the basic structure of an argument that identifies fundamental changes
in the social contract that threaten the progress we have made to date. I demand a fundamental
reorganization of society.
Depending on what we do or do not do, the period of transition to a society that is truly
economically, environmentally, and socially sustainable could be relatively quick--say 20-30 years.
Or the transition could be extended and extraordinarily frightening, bringing out the ugliness that
percolates in undercurrents in our society.  Organizations and leaders advocating racist, nativist, and
essentially fascist approaches to ease fear appeal to the sense of powerlessness of a growing segment
of our population.  Other networks, organizations and leaders are preparing for some “let the fittest
survive” nightmare in the underground economy, coping with imprisonment and the violence of the
streets.  And a growing number of wealthy people are absolutely comfortable being sealed off and
insulated from the consequences of a declining society, tolerating the worst abuses of our people and
our environment as long as they are secure and comfortable.  We live in a period where the vacuum
of social, political, and economic leadership will be filled.  The relative calm will not be permanent.
If we are determined to look honestly at the conditions of our cities and communities, rural and
urban, and apply what we have learned as reported in this paper, we can create livable and
sustainable environments for all people to prosper.
Well, if this is the beginning of a transition to a new economy that could take 30 or 40 years, what
should those of us who embrace this strategic vision do for the next 5?
1.  Continue to expand and refine the analysis through shared debate and critical reflection.  This
paper has just scratched the surface of a number of complex propositions.  Each element of this vision
needs to be refined, corrected, expanded, and finally reflected in a plan of action.  Common
intellectual work is an absolute requirement of those who lead, particularly at this early stage.  Of
course, this intellectual work must be reflected in our daily practical work as workers, union leaders,
business people, community organizers, religious activists, and others.
2.  Share your perspectives and experience and expand the debate by using the new technology.  New
information technology allows us to instantly internationalize the discussion  and flow of information.
This is one reason to immediately get on line, learn how to use E-mail and the Web, become familiar
with the technology, and participate.  CLCR will dedicate its new Web site to this exchange.  Find us
at <www.clcr.org>.  We list resources linked to this paper, provide interactive forums, and hotlinks to
other Web sites relevant to this work.
3.  Join with others in the coalition of labor, community, and business locally, regionally, and
nationally.  If you don’t have a group to discuss and work around these concepts--organize one.  If
you know of an organization that embraces at least most of these concepts, you really have an
obligation to join, or to get involved in one way or another.  And all of us should become active in
national organizations and international associations who share the objective of sustainable
develoment.
4.  We must pool our resources.  We need to find every opportunity to combine organizations and
capacity rather than continue to fragment.  We need to financially support and privilege the
businesses, entrepreneurs, and organizations that embrace this vision.
5.  We need the right mind-set for the beginning of a long process.  This kind of difficult early stage
requires the right mix of intolerance as well as tolerance, a determination to find what is positive in an
experience--no matter how small the percentage--and to build on that to overcome the negative, a
good sense of humor and humility, patience with set-backs knowing that we are in it for the long haul,
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and an absolute impatience with the paralysis and passivity that cedes power to the Low Road.
6.  We need to contend.
It is up to our generation to seize the opportunity that was best expressed by the Russian poet Anton
Chekov:
We will
make a new garden,
more splendid
than this one.
You will see it.
You will understand.
And joy,
    quiet,
   deep joy
will sink into your
soul
like the sun
at evening.
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Resources
The following organizations are mentioned in the paper.  If you want additional information on these
organizations and business, your can contact them directly.
Appalachian Center for Economic Networks (ACENet)
94 Columbus Road
Athens, OH 45701
614/592-3854
Banana Kelly Community Improvement
863 Prospect Avenue
Bronx, NY 10459
718/328-1064
Campaign for Sustainable Milwaukee
1726 N. First Street
Milwaukee, WI 53212
414/444-0525
Cooperative Home Care Associates
349 E. 149th Street, 5th Floor
Bronx, NY 10451
718/993-7104
Corporation for Enterprise Development
353 Folsom Street
San Francisco, CA 94105
415/495-2333
Crocus Fund
303-275 Broadway Avenue
Winnipeg,
204/925-2401
Equal Exchange
250 Revere Street
Canton, MA 02021
617/830-0303
Garment Industry Development Corporation
275 Seventh Avenue
New York, NY 10001
212/366-6160
ICA Group, Inc.
Statler Building, #1127
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Boston, MA 02116
617/338-0010
Inter Valley Project
95 Fair Oaks Avenue
Newton, MA 02160-1143
617/796-8836
Locker Associates, Inc.
225 Broadway, Suite 2625
New York, NY 10007
212/962-2980
Center for Labor and Community Research
3411 W. Diversey Avenue, Suite 10
Chicago, IL 60647
773/278-5418
Email:   CLCR@igc.org
<www.clcr.org>
Natural Resources Defense Council
40 W. 20th Street
New York, NY 10011
212/727-4479
New York Industrial Retention Network
175 Remsen St., Suite 350
Brooklyn, NY 11201
718/624-8600
Steel Valley Authority
Business Innovation Center
2nd Floor, Room 201
Duquesne, PA 15110
412/460-0488
Email:  tcroft@unidial.com
WireNet
6516 Detroit Avenue, Suite 3
Cleveland, OH 44102-3057
216/631-7330
Women’s Self-Employment Project
20 N. Clark Street, Suite 400
Chicago, IL 60606
312/606-8255
                                                          
1 The Cooperative Charitable Trust Forum is a small group of practitioners in the field of
employee ownership that meet regularly to discuss and critically evaluate the various issues
72
                                                                                                                                                                                          
and experiences of the field.  The Cooperative Charitable Trust, a small private foundation,
convenes the Forum.
2  The Ownership Solution, by Jeff Gates, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1998,
p.p.s. 4-5.
3  Human Development Report 1996, by the United Nations Development Program, New
York, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 1-4.
4  Jeff Gates, The Ownership Solution, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc.,
Reading, Massachusetts, 1998
1  “Intervening with Aging Owners to Save Industrial Jobs,” A Report to the Economic
Development Commission Foundation of Chicago, by CLCR, August 1989.
2  About 1% or less of manufacturing companies in Chicago were owned by African
American or Hispanic entrepreneurs, according to U.S. Department of Commerce statistics
in 1982.
3  “The Truly Disadvantaged,” by William Julius Wilson
4  CLCR’s Early Warning/Business Development System Manual
5  “Rational Re-industrialization” by Dan Luria and Jack Russell
6  “Toward a New Vision of Community Economic Development” by Swinney, Vasquez,
and Engelskirchen; 23 p.p.s., 1991, available from CLCR.
7  The Federation (FIRR) was comprised of some 35 mostly industrial retention
organizations from around the country.  It was headquartered in Chicago and closed its
doors in 1997, contributing its resources and energy to Sustainable America.
8  The Poverty Task Force was organized in Chicago in 1987 by Al Raby, a veteran of the
civil rights movement and the campaign director for Harold Washington’s first mayoral
election.  The PTF attracted a number of diverse Chicago organizations with the purpose of
creating an alternative economic development agenda focused on poverty eradication.
After a couple of years of struggling with the task and the untimely death of Al Raby, the
PTF closed.
9  The Consortium, known as MCEDA, was an effort by 10-15 labor, business, and
community development leaders from the midwest who collectively developed a broader
strategic vision for urban development described in a paper, “Metro-Futures.”  MCEDA
fell apart after the initial draft of the paper, which is still available from Sustainable
America.
10  Sustainable America (SA) was organized by some 20-30 organizations from community,
labor, environment, and progressive policy networks to develop a national movement with
73
                                                                                                                                                                                          
local strength around a program for sustainable development.
11  “The Hollow Corporation,” Business Week, March 3, 1986, pp. 56-78.
1  The New York Times, March 8, 1998, Business Section, p. 6
2  The Ownership Solution, Jeff Gates, p.60.
3 Equal Exchange Memorandum, Equal Exchange, Inc., August, 1997
4 Labor Research Review, published twice a year from 1983 to 1997 by CLCR, back
issues are available at www.clcr.org.
5  “Whose Job is it Anyway?,” Randy Barber, Labor Research Review #10, Spring 1987, p.
33.
6  This story was covered in detail in the first issue of CLCR’s Labor Research Review,
Fall, 1982.
7  Ron is now at the Office of Strategic Campaigns for the Teamsters and a member of
CLCR’s Board of Directors.
8  Locker Associates was founded by Mike Locker, a Board member of CLCR, and a
member of CLCR’s consulting network.
9 Steel Valley Authority was founded in 1989, and now is initiating the Heartland Fund to
finance worker-owned companies.
10  Labor Research Review #4, Winter, 1984
11  “Machinists Saved $137 Million at Eastern”, by Steve Abrecht, Labor Research Review
#10, Spring, 1987.
12  “Machinists vs. Management” by Paul Baicich, Labor Research Review #10, Spring
1987, p. 87.
13  For a full analysis of these approaches, see Labor Research Review #14, “Participating
in Management”, Fall, 1989.
14  “The Development Model of Organizing”, Dan Swinney, 1986, available from CLCR
1  New York Times, “Union Membership Slides Despite Increased Organizing” by Steve
Greenhouse, March 22, 1998, Section Y, Page 17
2  “Whose Job Is It, Anyway?  Capital Strategies for Labor,” Randy Barber  Labor
Research Review, # 10, Spring, 1987, pp. 31-44.
3  Labor Research Review #12, Fall, 1988, Andy Banks
74
                                                                                                                                                                                          
4 See Early Warning/Business Development System Manual available at CLCR.
5  The Ownership Solution, Jeff Gates, p.61.
6  Labor Research Review #6, Spring 1985, pp.5-23.
7  This seven year effort is described in detail in “Misadventures in Candyland” and
“Misadventures in Candyland II--the Sequel”, both available from CLCR at $5 each.  The
company, now Brach and Brock Confections, remains open on the West Side of Chicago,
employing some 1,500 people.
8  SLAPP stands for Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation--an acronym
describing frivolous and erroneous charges that corporations sometimes file against their
critics in an effort to bankrupt them through the high costs of legal defense.  Brach’s
SLAPP suit was dismissed by the courts, filed again, and then settled by the parties.
9  “A Misadventure in Candy Land,” by CLCR, p.9.
10"How Sweet It Is--A Study of Chicago Confectionery Industry,” an CLCR report, April
1998.
11  An earlier articulation of this strategy appeared in the paper, “Toward a New Vision of
Community Economic Development,” by Dan Swinney, Miguel Vasquez, and Howard
Engelskirchen, April 15, 1991, CLCR
12  “Alternatives To Industrial Decline: Results from the New York City Early Warning
Pilot Project,” January 1998, available from CLCR and Locker Associates .
13  The Candy Institute is a project of CLCR.
